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COMMENT
U.S. ENERGY SANCTIONS AND THE RACE TO
PREVENT IRAN FROM ACQUIRING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Quinton Cannon Farrar*
The United States has used economic sanctions targeting the energy
sector that is so vital to Iran’s economy with varying degrees of intensity
since the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979. By and large, the sanctions did not
have their intended effect. By 2010, Iran was the foremost state-sponsor of
terrorism and was on the brink of acquiring the capability to develop
nuclear weapons—a phenomenon that could have cataclysmic
repercussions for American interests in the Middle East and beyond.
In July 2010, Congress passed and President Obama signed the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010,
in an effort to use the most drastic sanctions measures yet to finally change
the course of Iran’s behavior. This Comment begins by tracing the history
of United States petroleum-related sanctions against Iran through various
inflection points since 1979. This Comment then discusses the political
context, content, and preliminary implementation of the latest round of
sanctions against Iran. Thereafter, this Comment critically analyzes the
legal bases, political challenges, and inherent policy difficulties
surrounding the new sanctions law. Finally, this Comment proposes a
number of policy recommendations for the President and Congress in light
of the changing policy landscape.
In sum, this Comment concludes that a far-reaching, robustly applied,
multilateral sanctions policy remains the last, best hope of peacefully
preventing Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of
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2010 (Comprehensive Act). 1 “In short,” President Obama said at the bill
signing ceremony, “with these sanctions, along with others, we are striking
at the heart of the Iranian Government’s ability to fund and develop its
nuclear program. We’re showing the Iranian Government that its actions
have consequences.” 2 Substantively, the Comprehensive Act greatly
expanded the types of actors (including non-U.S. corporations) that may be
sanctioned for their relationship with Iran; increased the number of
sanctions which the President must impose on actors in violation of the law;
and, at least in theory, made it more difficult for the President to avoid
issuing sanctions. 3 The President acknowledged that the bill he was signing
amounted to “the toughest sanctions against Iran ever passed by the United
States Congress.” 4
The drafters of the Comprehensive Act paid particular attention to
focusing sanctions on Iran’s energy sector. 5 Today, Iran holds the third
largest proven petroleum reserves in the world behind Saudi Arabia and
Canada, 6 and the second largest natural gas reserves behind only Russia.7
Revenues from the state-dominated energy sector account for nearly 80% of
Iran’s export earnings and roughly 40% of all government revenue. 8 Yet,
in spite of its enormous reserves, Iran’s energy infrastructure is decaying,
and without foreign investment and expertise, Iran faces a serious
production decline.9 Moreover, due to its lack of refining capacity, Iran has
to import close to half of all the gasoline it needs to meet domestic
consumption requirements. 10
By targeting firms that invest in Iran’s domestic energy infrastructure or
export refined petroleum products to Iran, the Comprehensive Act presents
the Obama Administration and its allies around the world with a
tremendous opportunity to put pressure on the Iranian regime to cease both
its development of nuclear weapons and its funding of international
terrorism. Since his election in 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad has tried to impose a markedly populist fiscal policy

1. Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 8501–8551). The Senate passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (Comprehensive Act) by a vote of 99-0; the House passed the bill
by a vote of 408-8. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS
13 (2011).
2. Remarks on Signing the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 568 (July 1, 2010).
3. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1317–28; see also Jay Solomon et al., U.S. Adds Its Own
Sanctions on Iran, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2010, at A7.
4. Remarks on Signing the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010, supra note 2, at 2.
5. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1317–28; see also KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 12–13.
6. SHAYERAH ILIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34525, IRAN’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS:
U.S. POLICY ISSUES 12 (2010).
7. Id. at 13.
8. Id. at 21.
9. Spencer Swartz & Benoit Faucon, Iran’s Falling Oil Output Means Less Revenue,
Clout, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2010, at A7.
10. ILIAS, supra note 6, at 21.
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providing extensive public subsidies on gasoline, food, and housing. 11
Although inflation was already quite high in Iran at the time of the passage
of the Comprehensive Act in July 2010, 12 once Ahmadinejad phased out the
subsidies in December 2010, due to fiscal pressure from mismanagement of
the economy and increasing international isolation, price increases in such
consumer staples as food, fuel, and transportation immediately began to
cause pain to Iranians. 13 Whereas Ahmadinejad was able to repress
domestic unrest following his reportedly fraudulent reelection in 2009,14 the
political fallout resulting from the across-the-board price shocks in 2011
could be widespread. 15 Thus, by attempting to cut off Iran from the global
petroleum markets, American policy makers have the potential to make the
cost of gasoline so dear, and the revenues from foreign investment so
scarce, that the Iranian regime, if it does not suspend its nuclear program,
must face the unenviable dilemma of further destroying the Iranian fiscal
system or facing the wrath of the Iranian population.
Yet, to what avail? In the past, American sanctions against Iran have
been largely unsuccessful in isolating the Iranian regime and forcing it to
end its belligerent behavior.16
As Part I of this Comment details, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution,
U.S. relations with Iran have been exceptionally adversarial. From the time
the Khomeinist regime took power, Iran has been assessed as an “unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and
economy of the United States.” 17 At no point, however, has the United
States’s rivalry with Iran hit as critical of an impasse as it has today. Iran
poses a potentially existential threat to Israel, 18 is actively seeking to
11. Id. at 6. Gasoline subsidies alone represented roughly 12% of Iran’s gross domestic
product. Id. The subsidies allowed gasoline to be sold at the equivalent of thirty-eight cents
per gallon. William Yong, Gas Prices Soar in Iran as Subsidy is Reduced, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
20, 2010, at A6.
12. In 2009, Iran’s consumer prices rose on a year-over-year average of greater than
13%. ILIAS, supra note 6, at 5.
13. Ramin Mostaghim & Borzou Daragahi, Prices and Anger Rise in Iran After
Subsidies Lifted, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2010, at A3.
14. See infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
15. See Mostaghim & Daragahi, supra note 13 (reporting on work stoppages across Iran
and emboldened political opposition to Ahmadinejad).
16. See infra Part I.
17. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979) (executive order from
President Carter freezing Iranian assets during hostage crisis); see also infra note 38 and
accompanying text.
18. In a recent visit to the United States, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
stated in a speech:
The greatest danger facing Israel and the world is the prospect of a nuclear-armed
Iran. Iran threatens to annihilate Israel. It denies the Holocaust. It sponsors terror.
It confronts America in Afghanistan and Iraq. It dominates Lebanon and Gaza. . . .
Now, this is what Iran is doing without nuclear weapons. Imagine what it would
do with them. Imagine the devastation that its terror proxies, Hezbollah and
Hamas and others, would wreak under an Iranian nuclear umbrella.
Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister, Israel, Speech at the General Assembly of the Jewish
Federations of North America in New Orleans (Nov. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/speechga081110.htm. Prime
Minister Netanyahu went on to argue that while the economic sanctions imposed upon Iran
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undermine the delicate and hard-won peace in Iraq, 19 and continues to be
the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world. 20 In sum, as a recent
National Security Strategy memorandum stated, the United States “may
face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran.” 21
The assessment of Iran’s threat to the national interests of the United
States stems in large part from Iran’s weapons of mass destruction
programs. 22 According to recent International Atomic Energy Agency
estimates, Iran has developed enough uranium for two nuclear weapons.23
Although the uranium has only been enriched to a level that would be
suitable for civilian energy purposes, U.S. intelligence officials estimate
that Iran is currently only three to five years away from developing nuclear
weapons if it continues to enrich uranium for belligerent purposes.24
Additionally, Iran’s support for international terrorist groups continues to
undermine the Israeli peace process, destabilize the extremely tentative
political equilibrium inside of U.S. allies Iraq and Lebanon, and has been
directly responsible for the death of American servicemen in Iraq and
Afghanistan. 25 Moreover, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks
by the United States and its allies were exacting a toll on the Iranian government, they will
not change the Iranian regime’s drive to attain a nuclear weapon unless they are backed by
“a credible threat of military action.” Id.
In a provocative article in the September 2010 issue of The Atlantic Monthly entitled “The
Point of No Return,” author Jeffrey Goldberg raised increased speculation that the Israeli
military will preemptively strike at Iran’s nuclear infrastructure to prevent or delay the
development of nuclear weapons by a regime that has repeatedly threatened to wipe the State
of Israel off the map. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Point of No Return, ATL. MONTHLY, Sept. 2010,
at 56. In response to Netanyahu’s contention that only the credible threat of military action
can cause Iran to end its nuclear ambitions, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that
while “when it comes to Iran . . . all options are on the table,” the Obama Administration
“continue[s] to believe that the political, economic approach that we are taking is in fact
having an impact in Iran.” Phil Stewart & Arshad Mohammed, U.S. Says Sanctions Against
Iran
“Having
Impact,”
REUTERS
(Nov.
8,
2010,
3:31
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6A70JA20101108. Although it is not clear what
the Obama Administration’s next course of action will be if the economic sanctions do not
work and Iran continues to develop nuclear weapons, the Administration has repeatedly
warned Israel that a military strike could have far-reaching consequences that are detrimental
to both countries’ interests in the region. See Goldberg, supra, at 59–61.
19. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32048, IRAN: U.S. CONCERNS AND
POLICY RESPONSES 40 (2010) (detailing Iranian efforts to engage in a proxy war by
providing arms, training, guidance, and financing to pro-Iranian militia groups involved in
sectarian violence that has killed American soldiers).
20. Id. at 37.
21. Id. at 19 n.9.
22. International scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear program intensified in 2003 when it was
revealed that A.Q. Khan, the nuclear scientist behind Pakistan’s development of nuclear
weapons, sold Iran nuclear technologies and designs. Id. at 23.
23. Id.
24. Id. Iranian leaders claim that Iran is developing nuclear technologies for peaceful
energy purposes, which they claim is their right as a party to the international Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. Id. at 24. These claims have been met with widespread skepticism in
the United States in part because of the perception that Iran’s regime views a nuclear weapon
as the strategic instrument it can use to dominate the Persian Gulf region. Id. Furthermore,
Iran is developing uranium enrichment sites that appear unsuitable for purely civilian uses.
Id. at 23.
25. Id. at 36–48.

2352

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

and the continuing Global War on Terror, Iran’s cooperation with Al Qaeda
and support for the Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan have caused
the rift between the United States and Iran to grow deeper.26
As the Obama Administration prepares to implement the Comprehensive
Act, there are legitimate questions over whether this new sanctions regime
will actually be given substance and force.27 After all, following the
passage of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), 28 the Clinton
and Bush Administrations did not sanction a single foreign company
investing in Iran’s energy sector, because of a desire to avoid international
trade conflicts. 29 Although the language of the Comprehensive Act is
apparently tougher and gives the President less discretionary space to avoid
carrying out sanctions, 30 it is not clear whether the Obama Administration
will have the temerity to carry out the sanctions to an extent that will make
them effective. 31
In Part I, this Comment recounts the history of U.S. sanctions toward
Iran, including the failures of the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. Part
II examines the present state of sanctions against Iran including President
Obama’s diplomatic efforts and the mandates imposed by Congress’s
passage of the Comprehensive Act. In Part III, this Comment critically
analyzes the potential legal and policy implications of the Comprehensive
Act. Part III discusses: (1) the legal barriers posed to implementing the
sanctions; (2) whether the amended language instituted by the
Comprehensive Act will make it any more likely that extraterritorial
sanctions will be effectively implemented; and (3) whether, given the
checkered history of U.S. economic sanctions, the Act will have the desired
effect or potentially backfire. In Part IV, this Comment asserts that the full
implementation of the Comprehensive Act represents the last best chance to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons without resorting to armed
conflict. This Comment contends that the Obama Administration should
sanction companies from countries—especially China—that are not
cooperating in implementing sanctions that do energy-related business with
Iran.
26. Id. at 44–47.
27. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Jon Kyl, Kyl Reaction to Sanctions on NAFTIRAN
(Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://kyl.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=328110 (“For more than
12 years, the Iran Sanctions Act has not been enforced. . . . The Administration, by
continuing to ignore blatant violations of our sanctions laws by Chinese companies, has
undermined our sanctions regime on Iran.”).
28. Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541.
29. See KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 6.
30. For instance, under the previous legislation, the President could issue a waiver if it
was “important” to the United States’s national interest. § 9(c), 110 Stat. at 1547. The
Comprehensive Act amends that provision, requiring that the President only issue a waiver if
it is “necessary” to the national interest. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, § 102(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1312, 1322
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 8513(f)(1)).
31. See, e.g., Josh Rogin, Will the Obama Administration Sanction Chinese Companies
Doing Business in Iran?, FOREIGN POLICY: THE CABLE (Oct. 5, 2010, 1:31 PM),
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/05/will_the_obama_administration_sanction
_chinese_companies_doing_business_in_iran.
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I. A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN’S ENERGY
SECTOR (1979–2009)
The United States has used economic sanctions targeted against Iran’s
energy sector as a foreign policy tool since the time of the Iranian
Revolution and the subsequent Hostage Crisis of 1979. This part traces the
history of those sanctions over the thirty years from the Hostage Crisis until
the inauguration of President Barack Obama in 2009. As this part
demonstrates, such sanctions were largely unsuccessful in causing Iran to
alter its belligerent behavior.
A. Primary Sanctions by Executive Order
1. The Hostage Crisis (1979–1981)
Mass demonstrations in opposition to the government of the Shah of Iran,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, caused the collapse of the Shah’s regime in
January 1979. 32 After stoking the revolution in exile, 33 the Iranian cleric
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran to declare an Islamic
Republic of Iran. 34 From the beginning, Khomeini fiercely opposed the
policies of the United States, stating that “[a]ll our problems come from
America.” 35
On November 4, 1979, pro-Khomeini radicals seized the U.S. embassy in
Iran and took sixty-six Americans hostage. 36 U.S. President Jimmy Carter
acted almost immediately by issuing a proclamation imposing a ban on the
importation of Iranian oil into the United States. 37 Two days later, when he
learned that the Iranians were about to pull all of their assets out of
American banks, Carter issued an executive order, which blocked all
property within U.S. jurisdiction owned by the Central Bank and
Government of Iran, thereby freezing their assets.38 By April 1980,
32. KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE PERSIAN PUZZLE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND
AMERICA 134–35 (2004).
33. Id. at 131.
34. See id. at 145.
35. Id. at 146; see also id. at 156 (“Khomeini’s obsessive hatred for the United States
was a central motivating force in his decision making.”).
36. Id. at 153.
37. Id. at 164; see Proclamation No. 4702, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,581 (Nov. 12, 1979)
(“[R]ecent developments in Iran have exacerbated the threat to the national security posed by
imports of petroleum and petroleum products. Those developments underscore the threat to
our national security which results from our reliance on Iran as a source of crude oil.”).
President Jimmy Carter derived statutory authority to suspend imports of petroleum from
Iran from Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. Id. (citing the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2006)). Section 232 authorizes the President to regulate
imports of a commodity if the President determines that the commodity “is being imported
into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair
the national security.” Id. § 1862(b)(3)(A) .
38. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979); POLLACK, supra note
32, at 164. In order to freeze the assets by executive order, the President acted under the
authority vested in him by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979) (citing the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)). In order to impose economic
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President Carter broke diplomatic relations with Iran and issued executive
orders instituting a total embargo on U.S. exports to Iran, imposing a ban on
all imports from Iran, and prohibiting U.S. citizens from traveling to Iran or
conducting financial transactions there.39
These sanctions did not have their desired effect, however, as Iran
refused to release the hostages. 40 As a result of the Iranian intransigence in
the face of sanctions, President Carter ordered a military rescue attempt,
Operation Eagle Claw, which ended tragically when a sandstorm caused
some of the American helicopters to crash in the Iranian desert. 41 Eight
American servicemen lost their lives. 42
The Hostage Crisis did not come to an end until President Ronald Reagan
took office in January 1981. 43 On January 19, 1981, the United States and
Iran signed a negotiated settlement known as the Algiers Accords. 44 On
January 21, 1981, after 444 days as hostages, the American captives were
finally released. 45 Pursuant to the Algiers Accords, the United States
revoked all of the previous executive orders that prevented oil imports from
Iran and barred American oil companies from doing business with Iran. 46
2. The Lebanese Civil War
Beginning in August 1982, the United States stationed Marines in Beirut,
Lebanon as part of an international peacekeeping force during the Lebanese
Civil War. 47 On April 18, 1983, a suicide-bomber detonated a truck packed
with explosives at the American Embassy in Beirut. 48 Sixty-three people
were killed. 49 Later that year, on October 23, 1983, another suicide bomber
sanctions under the IEEPA, the President must declare a state of national emergency, defined
by the Act as any “unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy
of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). It is interesting to note that, despite the
requirements of the IEEPA that he do so, President Carter never consulted with Congress
when imposing sanctions on Iran; nor did Congress insist upon it. HOSSEIN ALIKHANI,
SANCTIONING IRAN: ANATOMY OF A FAILED POLICY 53 (2000).
39. Exec. Order No. 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685 (Apr. 17, 1980) (prohibiting all
imports from Iran and imposing a ban on travel to Iran); Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed.
Reg. 24,099 (Apr. 7, 1980) (imposing an export ban on Iran); POLLACK, supra note 32, at
167.
40. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 166–67.
41. Id. at 168–69.
42. Id. at 169.
43. Id. at 172.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Exec. Order No. 12,282, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,925 (Jan. 19, 1981) (revoking previous
executive orders sanctioning Iran).
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court held that it
was within the President’s authority under Article II of the Constitution as the country’s
chief diplomat to negotiate the terms of the Algiers Accords and dispose of claims against
foreign countries without express authorization of Congress. Id. at 686.
47. PATRICK TYLER, A WORLD OF TROUBLE: THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE MIDDLE
EAST—FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR 283–84 (2009).
48. Id. at 290–92.
49. Id. at 291.
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detonated a truck bomb inside the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut.50
A total of 241 American servicemen were killed.51
The pro-Iranian militant Islamist group Hizbollah claimed responsibility
for both blasts, and American intelligence determined that Iranian officials
supervised the planning of the attacks. 52 The suicide attack on the Marine
barracks, at the time, caused the greatest loss of American lives in one day
since Vietnam, 53 and led to the withdrawal of American forces from
Lebanon. 54
In response to Iran’s support for Hizbollah and complicity in the Beirut
bombings, in January 1984, the State Department declared Iran a “state
sponsor of terrorism.” 55 This designation earned Iran a number of
economic sanctions which effectively denied foreign aid to Iran and denied
the use of credit guarantees or other financial assistance from American
parties to be used by Iran in acquiring weapons.56
3. The Iran-Iraq War
On September 22, 1980, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army invaded Iran.57
Although the Reagan Administration, following the release of the American
hostages, came into office wanting to have little to do with Iran, the
battlefield successes of the Ayatollah’s armies in 1982 caused the
Administration to fear that the Iranians would drive through Iraq westward
to Jordan and Israel, or southward into the oil-rich Gulf states. 58 In
response, the United States began to supply Iraq with civilian goods and
intelligence; and in spite of its arms embargo against both countries, the
United States began to encourage its European allies to supply Iraq with the
munitions it needed to conduct the war.59
Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, the Reagan Administration imposed a
number of economic sanctions against Iran, seeking to further restrict its
access to goods that could have military purposes and deny its ability to
finance its war and terror propagation.60 Furthermore, in order to protect
the oil shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf, which were under attack by
Iranian-laid mines and Iranian armored vessels, the U.S. Navy got directly
involved in the war by escorting oil tankers through the Gulf.61

50. Id. at 297–98.
51. Id. at 298.
52. See POLLACK, supra note 32, at 203.
53. TYLER, supra note 47, at 298.
54. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 205.
55. KATZMAN, supra note 19, at 61. On January 13, 1984, Secretary of State George
Shultz openly accused Iran of participating in the bombing of the Marine barracks.
ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 154.
56. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 154.
57. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 184–86.
58. Id. at 233–34.
59. Id. at 234.
60. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 154–56.
61. See POLLACK, supra note 32, at 223–27 (detailing the Tanker War).
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Yet, in spite of Iran’s belligerence and the designation of the country as a
state sponsor of terrorism, the United States continued to buy petroleum
from Iran. By 1987, Iran had become the second leading source of oil for
the United States. 62 In fact, the U.S. Department of Energy was purchasing
Iranian oil for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 63
Outraged by the Department of Energy’s purchases of Iranian oil, in
1987 Congress passed resolutions calling for a ban on Iranian imports.64
President Reagan, not wanting to be outdone by Congress, 65 issued an
Executive Order on October 29, 1987 prohibiting importation of Iranian
crude oil and all other Iranian products.66
4. Clinton Administration Executive Orders
Following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and the Persian
Gulf War with Iraq in 1991, little changed with respect to America’s
policies toward Iran. 67 The United States pursued a policy of “dual
containment” in which it made multilateral efforts to isolate both Iraq and
Iran internationally. 68 When the Republicans took control of Congress in
1995 behind new House Speaker Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with
America,” however, they immediately began to press President Bill Clinton
to strengthen his policies against Iran. 69 At that time, Iran had begun
aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, was overtly
undermining American efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and
remained the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism. 70 President
Clinton’s previous multilateral containment strategies had done little to
persuade Iran to change its belligerent behavior. 71 Moreover, in spite of the
ban still in place from the Reagan Administration,72 by 1995, the United
States was Iran’s third largest trading partner and the largest purchaser of its
oil. 73 Thus, the Clinton Administration appeared hypocritical when trying
to persuade foreign countries to prevent their companies from doing
business with Iran while looking the other way as American companies did

62. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Senators, 98 to 0, Back Import Ban Against Tehran, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1987, at A1.
63. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 156.
64. Id. at 156; see also Fuerbringer, supra note 62.
65. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 156.
66. Exec. Order No. 12,613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (Oct. 29, 1987). To impose the import
ban on Iran, President Reagan used the statutory authority of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985, § 505, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9 (2006), which prohibits
imports from state sponsors of terrorism. Exec. Order No. 12,613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,940.
67. For a summary of U.S.-Iran relations during the George H.W. Bush Administration,
see POLLACK, supra note 32, at 244–59.
68. See ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 166–70 (detailing dual containment sanctions);
POLLACK, supra note 32, at 259–65 (detailing the policy behind dual containment).
69. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 270.
70. Id. at 265–70.
71. Id. at 270.
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
73. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 270.
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the same. 74 This issue culminated when Conoco, an American oil
company, signed a one billion dollar contract to develop oil fields in Iran on
March 6, 1995. 75
Shortly thereafter, on March 15, President Clinton signed an executive
order prohibiting all petroleum development deals with Iran by U.S.
companies, declaring that Iran “constitute[s] an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States.” 76 Yet, even this move was criticized as too weak on Capitol Hill
because the executive order allowed American companies to purchase oil
from Iran and sell it to third countries—a practice that then accounted for a
quarter of all oil sold by Iran. 77 Hoping to be able to finally take the moral
high ground in encouraging multilateral sanctions against Iran, 78 on May 6,
1995, Clinton went even further in signing another executive order which
banned all trade with Iran, including by the foreign subsidiaries of
American corporations. 79 U.S. trade with Iran diminished immediately. 80
B. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
1. The Passage of Extraordinary Measures
President Clinton’s executive orders did not do a great deal to inhibit Iran
or influence foreign nations; it ironically only ended up hurting the
American businesses forced to end commerce with Iran. 81 As a result of a
process dubbed “backfilling,” in which companies move into sanctioned
countries to take over contracts abandoned by companies complying with
the sanctions, 82 the effect on Iran of losing American markets and investors
was essentially nullified. 83 Instead, the Iranians were able to find new
buyers for their oil at similar prices and new companies to invest in their
energy sector. 84
Some members of Congress were chaffing to extend sanctions even
further to foreign companies doing business in Iran, which they thought
would increase multilateral involvement in the sanctions.85 The Clinton
74. Id.
75. Id. at 271.
76. Exec. Order 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 15, 1995). President Clinton used
his statutory authority under the IEEPA to impose the sanctions. Id.; see also supra note 38.
77. Douglas Jehl, Oil Concern Ends a Deal with Iran as President Acts, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1995, at A1.
78. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 273.
79. Exec. Order 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 6, 1995). In addition to the statutory
authority vested in the President by IEEPA, see supra note 38, President Clinton relied on
Section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 to cut
off all commerce with Iran by American companies and their foreign subsidiaries, Exec.
Order 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. at 24,757; see also supra note 66.
80. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 273.
81. See id.
82. See generally Rogin, supra note 31 (describing practice of backfilling).
83. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 273.
84. Id.
85. See ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 288.
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Administration struck a deal with Congressional members to postpone
consideration of such legislation that had the great possibility of alienating
many of America’s trading partners in exchange for Clinton’s promise that
he would pressure U.S. allies at the G7 summit in June 1995 to limit trade
with Iran. 86 Those efforts failed. 87
A year later, on June 25, 1996, a truck bomb decimated a building at the
Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia that was used to house American
military personnel deployed to defend Saudi Arabia.88 Nineteen Americans
were killed and another 372 were wounded. 89 It was quickly proven that a
group known as Hizballah al-Hijaz, a thinly-veiled proxy for the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard that had been trained and equipped in Iran, was
responsible for the carnage.90
Exasperated with both Iran and America’s allies, Congress acted.91
Senator Alfonse D’Amato of New York introduced legislation that would
impose “extraterritorial” sanctions on foreign companies investing in Iran’s
energy sector. 92 The D’Amato bill required the President to impose at least
two out of a list of six sanctions on foreign companies that invested more
than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector.93 The law gave the
President discretion to waive sanctions if the home country of the violating
firm agreed to impose economic sanctions on Iran, or if the President
certified that a waiver was “important” to the United States’s national
interest. 94 Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts eventually added
Libya to the sanctions for its complicity in the Pan Am Flight 103
bombing, 95 as well as its more endemic support for terrorism and efforts to

86. Id.
87. Id. at 288–89. The G7 then included Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and Italy. Id. The insult to the United States was compounded when the French
firm Total S.A. took over the $600 million contract that the Clinton Administration
pressured Conoco to abandon. Id.
88. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 282.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 286.
92. Id. at 287. Extraterritorial sanctions “reach beyond U.S. borders to . . . attach
economic penalties to foreign firms for their dealings with sanctioned countries. Their aim
is to broaden the observance of unilateral measures by applying U.S. law to private actors in
third countries that have not imposed parallel controls.” KENNETH A. RODMAN, SANCTIONS
BEYOND BORDERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 1
(2001).
93. The six sanctions from which the President could choose were: (1) denial of ExportImport Bank assistance for exports, (2) denial of export licenses or other specific permission
under the U.S. export control laws, (3) denial of loans in excess of $10 million in any twelve
month period from U.S. financial institutions, (4) prohibitions on sanctioned financial
institutions from designation as a primary dealer in U.S. debt or as a repository of
government funds, (5) ban on contracts with the U.S. government, and (6) case-by-case
imposition of import restrictions. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104172, § 6, 110 Stat. 1541, 1545–46 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note).
94. § 9, 110 Stat. at 1547–48.
95. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 287.
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acquire weapons of mass destruction. 96 Congress passed the bill—entitled
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act—on July 23, 1996. 97
Many members of the executive branch despised the bill. 98 The ILSA
was designed to proscribe wholly foreign activities by wholly foreign
entities conducting such activities that were entirely legal in their home
countries. 99 The bill amounted to a secondary boycott of Iran.100 The
United States had been the staunchest opponent to the secondary boycotts
imposed upon Israel by Arab countries. 101 In fact, Congress had made
complying with the Arab boycotts a crime for U.S. companies. 102
Furthermore, secondary boycotts were forbidden by the rules of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). 103 For Clinton Administration diplomats and
economic officials who were fighting to liberalize world trade, the ILSA
undermined their case for trading partners to lower trade barriers. 104
As was often the case, however, President Clinton’s political advisors
won the day. 105 They pointed out that Iran had just killed nineteen
Americans and was despised by the American public at large, and that the
bill had passed Congress by such an overwhelming margin that the
President’s veto could have been easily overridden, thereby making the
President appear even weaker. 106 Others in the Administration saw the Act
as a useful tool to convince Iran’s trading partners that serious action
needed to be taken to punish Iran. 107 On August 5, 1996, President Clinton
signed the ILSA into law, stating: “I can only hope that some day soon, all
countries will come to realize that you simply can’t do business with people
by day who are killing your people by night.” 108
2. Challenges from the Inception
The passage of the ILSA infuriated Iran’s trading partners in the
European Union, Russia, and elsewhere around the world. 109 The European
96. § 3(b), 110 Stat. at 1542.
97. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 287.
98. Id. at 287.
99. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 389 (“Investment in Iranian petroleum resources is
perfectly lawful for non-US companies outside the United States.”).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 311.
102. Id.
103. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 287.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 287–88.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 287–88.
108. Remarks on Signing the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 and an Exchange
With Reporters, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1403–04 (Aug. 5, 1996).
109. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 288; see also ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 320 (quoting a
European ambassador as stating: “American diplomacy has a taste for embargoes and
boycotts which we do not share. . . . [W]e have not elected the American Congress, we have
never voted for it and I do not see why we should let it legislate for the rest of the world.”).
International furor over extraterritorial sanctions had been sparked earlier in 1996 when
Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6021–6091 (2006)—better known as the Helms-Burton Act—which was aimed at foreign
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Union declared the extraterritorial sanctions illegal, 110 and passed
legislation forbidding European companies from complying with the
ILSA. 111 The European Council regulation held that no judgment made
pursuant to the ILSA by a U.S. court or administrative body would be
recognized or enforceable in any manner. 112 The regulation also obliged
the officers of European companies to report to the European Commission
whether their commercial interests were being affected by U.S. actions so
that the European Union would be fully aware of the pressures the United
States was exerting on European companies. 113 Furthermore, to counteract
the ILSA’s requirement that the President investigate whether a
sanctionable act has occurred, the European regulation prohibited anyone
from providing any information which could facilitate the President in
making such a determination. 114
In October 1996, the European Union initiated formal WTO proceedings
against the United States over the extraterritorial sanctions.115 The United
States pressured the European Union to end the proceedings on the grounds
that the sanctions involved foreign policy and national security issues that
were outside the purview of the WTO. 116 The Clinton Administration
announced, when the WTO dispute resolution panel was formed, that it
would not participate in the case on the theory that the United States had
discretion to determine unilaterally whether the WTO’s national security
provisions applied. 117
Despite the countermeasures imposed by the European Union, not a
single foreign company entered into a development deal with Iran for over a
year. 118 The mere threat of U.S. sanctions was seemingly having the
desired effect of deterring companies from investing in Iran. 119 It was not

corporations that were negotiating joint ventures with the state-owned businesses of the
Cuban government. RODMAN, supra note 92, at 176–83. Some of the property involved in
certain joint ventures had been seized by the Cuban government after the Cuban revolution
from Cubans who fled to America. Id. at 176–77. The most controversial piece of the bill
created a private right of action for U.S. citizens, including naturalized Cubans, to sue
foreign corporations for trafficking in confiscated property. Id. at 177–78.
110. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 288.
111. The blocking statute also had application to the Helms-Burton Act. ALIKHANI, supra
note 38, at 326; Harry L. Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign
Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 61, 81–83 (1999).
112. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 326–27.
113. Id. at 327.
114. Id.
115. Clark, supra note 111, at 87.
116. Id. at 88.
117. Clark, supra note 111, at 88 n.129; see also Paul Blustein & Anne Swardson, U.S.
Vows to Boycott WTO Panel, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at A1 (quoting Stuart Eizenstat,
the Clinton Administration’s point person for negotiating with the European Union over the
sanctions, stating that the World Trade Organization (WTO) panel had “no competence” to
rule on U.S. foreign policy).
118. See POLLACK, supra note 32, at 287–88.
119. Id.; see also RODMAN, supra note 92, at 187 (“ILSA influenced energy firms with
significant U.S. business because they recognized that this is an issue with strong
congressional support and a powerful domestic constituency. . . . Given the uncertainties of
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until September 1997 that the first project that was determined to be in
violation of the ILSA was signed, a $2 billion contract for Total S.A. of
France and its partners, Gazprom of Russia, and Petronas of Malaysia, to
develop a gas field in Iran. 120
Faced with a direct challenge to the enforcement of the sanctions on the
one hand, and the European blocking statutes and WTO proceedings from
the European Union on the other, the Clinton Administration was faced
with a strategic dilemma. Congress was infuriated by the Total S.A. deal
and began putting pressure on the Administration to issue sanctions.121
Earlier that year in April 1997, however, the Administration came to an
agreement with the EU just days before the WTO formal proceedings were
slated to begin, wherein the EU agreed to suspend its WTO dispute so long
as the Administration avoided sanctioning European firms under the HelmsBurton Act or the ILSA. 122 Thus, if the Clinton Administration sanctioned
Total S.A., it would unravel the negotiated understanding with the EU and
resume the WTO dispute; 123 but if the Administration waived the sanctions,
according to one Administration official, “every non-American energy firm
on the globe [was] going to race in after [Total].” 124
Seeking to find a common ground that would pacify Congress and avoid
a trade war with Europe, Clinton finally reached a negotiated compromise
with the EU on May 18, 1998. 125 The European Union agreed to work
harder to tighten export controls on materials and technology that Iran could
use to develop weapons of mass destruction. 126 Accordingly, the Clinton
Administration agreed to waive ILSA sanctions for the Total S.A.
contract, 127 and indicated further that EU firms would continue to receive
such waivers. 128 The standoff resulted in a clear victory for the Europeans,
leaving European companies to invest freely in Iran; 129 and once the
agreement was reached, the floodgates to Iranian investment opened.130
U.S. behavior, foreign oil companies initially took a risk-averse approach and held off from
Iranian contracts.”).
120. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 6.
121. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 329–30 (stating that thirteen senators wrote to President
Clinton warning that “[a] decision not to sanction will reveal the United States as a paper
tiger, thus opening the floodgate for future investments and enriching a nation bent on
buying weapons of mass destruction and funding terrorism”).
122. European Union-United States: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the
U.S. Helms-Barton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, U.S.-Eur., Apr. 11, 1997,
36 I.L.M. 529; see also Clark, supra note 111, at 89.
123. See RODMAN, supra note 92, at 187.
124. Id. (second alteration in original).
125. Id. at 188.
126. Id.
127. See ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 330–31. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
stated that the reasons for invoking the “national interest” waiver included increased
European cooperation on issues of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and that “granting the
waiver will prevent retaliation against U.S. firms which the imposition of sanctions would
probably engender and avoid possible challenges based on claims related to treaties and
other international obligations.” Id.
128. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 6 & n.7.
129. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 330.
130. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 289.
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Thus, what deterrent effect the ILSA might have had outside of actually
imposing sanctions became nullified once companies understood that
sanctions were not much more than an empty threat.
C. The Bush Administration: Continuation of a Failed Policy
When President George W. Bush’s Administration began—with several
former oil executives in senior positions, including the President himself
and his Vice President—it appeared that the Administration might support
eliminating energy sanctions against Iran. 131 With the ILSA set to expire in
August 2001, Congress moved early in President Bush’s first term to pass
laws extending the sanctions. 132 President Bush unsuccessfully tried to
negotiate a lesser extension of two years, but, faced with veto-proof
majorities in both houses, signed the five-year extension proposed by
Congress. 133
The potential for a rapprochement with Iran, which was considered
possible following Iran’s initial cooperation against the Taliban in
Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 134 was eliminated
by President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union Address, in which
President Bush included Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, in an “axis
of evil” that threatened the United States and free peoples around the
world. 135 Moreover, from the beginning of the War in Afghanistan, sources
showed that Iran was arming and training terrorists to kill American
soldiers and giving safe harbor to members of Al-Qaeda. 136 Given that
President Bush argued that the United States would not distinguish between
terrorists and the states that harbored them, it appeared as if Iran would
become a prime target for action in the “Global War on Terror.”137

131. Id. at 343. Reacting to the Clinton-era oil company sanctions in 1996, Vice
President Richard Cheney, then the Chairman of Halliburton, called the sanctions “self
defeating,” and remarked that “[t]here seems to be an assumption that somehow we know
what’s best for everybody else.” Id.
132. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN-LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT
4 (2003).
133. Id. President Bush, in his signing statement, did soften the rhetoric of the law which
he was signing by leaving open the possibility that he would be amenable to discontinuing
the sanctions should relations with Iran improve: “I believe that we should review sanctions
frequently to assess their effectiveness and continued suitability.” Statement on Signing the
ILSA Extension Act of 2001, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1132 (Aug. 3, 2001).
134. See generally MICHAEL A. LEDEEN, THE IRANIAN TIME BOMB 178–98 (2007)
(detailing U.S.-Iran relations in the period following 9/11); POLLACK, supra note 32, at 343–
352.
135. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 38 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 135 (Jan. 29, 2002) (“States like these and their terrorist allies constitute
an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms
to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or
attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would
be catastrophic.”); see also POLLACK, supra note 32, at 352.
136. LEDEEN, supra note 134, at 180; POLLACK, supra note 32, at 351.
137. LEDEEN, supra note 134, at 178.
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Preoccupied by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, the Bush
Administration never developed a formal strategy for dealing with the
Iranian threat throughout its two terms in office.138 As such, the Clinton
Administration policy of avoiding the enforcement of sanctions under the
ILSA continued under the Bush Administration as well—and not just for
firms who were covered by the United States’s trade agreement with the
European Union. 139
Faced again with an expiration deadline for the sanctions in 2006,
Congress voted for another five-year extension. 140 In this legislation,
however, Congress created a formal reporting structure for Congress to
conduct oversight to ensure the law was being enforced properly. 141 The
1996 version of ISLA did not create formal investigative guidelines through
which the President was expected to make his determinations; it merely
gave to the President the power to sanction parties once he had made
determinations based on his own discretion.142 In 2006, Congress, although
using precatory language, sought to close this loophole by providing that
the President “should” initiate an investigation “upon receipt by the United
States of credible information” that a party was violating the law. 143 The
amended statute also provided that the President “should” make his
determinations within 180 days and report to Congress the basis for his
determinations.144
Despite Congress’s efforts, however, no firms were sanctioned as
required by the law. 145 Yet, other than the May 1998 national interest
waiver granted by the Clinton Administration, no waivers of sanctions were
issued to the long list of companies in violation of the law; nor were reports
of investigations submitted to Congress. 146
In addition to all of the oil investments that were signed in violation of
American sanctions, Iran’s gas sector, which was virtually non-existent
138. See id. at 184 (“[T]he Bush [A]dministration still had no formal Iran policy and, like
its predecessors, had not effectively responded to the ongoing Iranian war against us.”).
Perhaps contrary to public perception, President Bush balked at using force to strike
Iranian nuclear facilities, resisting the urgings of more hawkish aides and commentators such
as William Kristol of The Weekly Standard and Charles Krauthammer of The Washington
Post, whom Bush referred to in private as “the bomber boys.” Goldberg, supra note 18, at
60.
139. Aside from European firms, companies from India, China, Russia, and Switzerland,
among many others, signed development contracts. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 24–28. The
Bush Administration expressed a desire to maintain President Clinton’s multilateral strategy
of working with the Europeans to persuade Iran to end its nuclear enrichment and support for
terrorism, and therefore did not want to antagonize them by enforcing sanctions against their
companies. KATZMAN, supra note 132, at 4.
140. Iran Freedom Support Act, Pub. L. No. 109-293, § 201, 120 Stat. 1344 (2006)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note).
141. See KATZMAN, supra note 132, 5–6.
142. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6, 110 Stat. 1541,
1545 (1996) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note).
143. § 201, 120 Stat. 1344, 1345.
144. § 201, 120 Stat. at 1345–46.
145. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 6.
146. Id.
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prior to its opening to foreign investment in 1998, has today become an
increasingly integral part of Iran’s economy. 147 What is more, the U.S.
government has enriched foreign firms who have been in violation of its
policy on Iran with government contracts.148 In essence, the U.S.
government has looked the other way at violations of its laws, thereby
making the sanctions laws ineffectual through non-enforcement. 149
II. THE COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY AND
DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010
As Part I of this Comment demonstrated, by the time President Barack
Obama and the 111th Congress entered office in 2009, it was clear that the
status quo policy with respect to Iran was a failure. This part discusses the
efforts of both the President and Congress to reshape the Iran policies of
America and its international partners, culminating with the passage and
implementation of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and
Divestment Act of 2010.
A. Speaking Softly: President Obama’s Failed Policy of Outreach
President Obama’s Administration took office in January 2009, with the
belief that it had an opportunity for renewed diplomatic dialogue to deter
Iran from developing weapons of mass destruction and build a constructive
framework of relations after three decades of hostility. 150 In pursuit of its
“open-hand” policy toward Iran, 151 the Obama Administration articulated
that it would offer enticements such as aiding in the development of Iran’s
peaceful nuclear energy and helping to integrate Iran into the global
economy in exchange for Iranian suspension of its nuclear program. 152
On March 19, 2009, in a videotaped peace greeting to “the people and
leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran” on the occasion of the Iranian New
147. Id.
148. Jo Becker & Ron Nixon, U.S. Enriches Companies Defying Its Policy on Iran, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, at A1. Nearly $15 billion was paid to companies that were investing in
Iran’s energy sector, in direct violation of the ILSA. Id. Additionally, oil and gas companies
that have invested in Iran have won lucrative leases to some fourteen million acres of
offshore and onshore federal land for energy exploration. Id.
149. But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-58, IRAN SANCTIONS: IMPACT
IN FURTHERING U.S. OBJECTIVES IS UNCLEAR AND SHOULD BE REVIEWED 15 (2007) (noting
that State Department officials contended that the Act “has been useful in raising U.S.
concerns over Iran” as a diplomatic tool).
150. KATZMAN, supra note 19, at 50–51; see also Remarks on Signing the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, supra note 2 (President Obama stated: “Since taking office,
I’ve made it clear that the United States was prepared to begin a new chapter of engagement
with the Islamic Republic of Iran.”). But see Michael Ledeen, Op-Ed, We’ve Been Talking to
Iran for 30 Years, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2009, at A23 (quoting Defense Secretary Robert
Gates as noting that “every administration since 1979 has reached out to the Iranians in one
way or another and all have failed”).
151. Six days after his inauguration Obama reiterated the sentiments he made in his
inaugural address by stating that “[i]f countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist,
they will find an extended hand from us.” Yochi J. Dreazen & Jay Solomon, Obama Offers
Open Channels to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at A10.
152. KATZMAN, supra note 19, at 50–51.
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Year, Obama stated: “My [A]dministration is now committed to diplomacy
that addresses the full range of issues before us . . . . This process will not
be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and
grounded in mutual respect.” 153 Then, in early April, the State Department
formally declared that the United States would participate in face-to-face
negotiations with the Iranians.154 Thereafter, President Obama stepped up
his efforts toward direct negotiations by writing a letter directly to Iran’s
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, expressing a desire to amicably
resolve the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program and to bring an end to
decades of hostility between the two countries.155
Although the Iranians never responded directly to any of Obama’s
overtures, in late May the Iranians successfully tested a rocket capable of
striking Israel and U.S. military bases in the Middle East.156 Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad celebrated the test by declaring: “In the
nuclear case, we send them a message: Today the Islamic Republic of Iran
is running the show.” 157
When the Iranian regime violently suppressed popular protests that arose
in response to the June 12, 2009 presidential elections that were widely
thought to be rigged in favor of Ahmadinejad, President Obama vacillated,
initially refusing to condemn the fraudulent elections or the crackdown that
followed. 158 Only after the graphic scenes of the Iranian repression were
seen by the world, and only after several European leaders had already
strongly denounced the Iranian regime, did Obama make a statement
condemning the violence.159 Nevertheless, Obama did not publicly support
the opposition, 160 and moreover, the President hedged his language by
assuring the Iranians: “I’ve made it clear that the United States respects the
sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran and is not interfering with Iran’s
affairs.” 161 Obama held fast to his policy of outreach toward Iran. 162
On September 9, 2009, Iran finally responded to the invitation to
negotiate—five months after the invitation was proffered—by issuing a
negotiation proposal which conspicuously ignored issues surrounding its
nuclear enrichment. 163 Instead, Iran publicly ruled out any compromise on
the nuclear issue, insisting that it would never give up its right to a nuclear

153. Jay Solomon, Obama Video Message Reaches Out to Iranians, WALL ST. J., Mar.
20, 2009, at A3.
154. Jay Solomon, U.S. to Join Iran Nuclear Talks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2009, at A10.
155. Jay Solomon & Chip Cummins, U.S. Further Ramps Up Contact With Iran, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 21, 2009, at A5.
156. Chip Cummins, Iran Tests Missile, Launching Pre-Election Show of Defiance,
WALL ST. J., May 21, 2009, at A8.
157. Stephen F. Hayes, Obama Caves to Iran, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 28, 2009, at 9.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. President’s News Conference, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 498 (June 23, 2009).
162. Hayes, supra note 157, at 9.
163. Farnaz Fassihi & Jay Solomon, Iran Rejects Compromise Over Its Nuclear Program,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2009, at A1.
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program. 164 Later that month, the United States revealed publicly for the
first time that the Iranians were clandestinely enriching uranium at a nuclear
facility that they were keeping secret from the international community.165
At this time, Obama’s engagement strategy began to come under serious
criticism internationally, as French President Nicholas Sarkozy remarked:
“I support the extended hand of the Americans, but what good have
proposals for dialogue brought the international community? More
uranium enrichment and declarations by the leaders of Iran to wipe a UN
member state [Israel] off the map.” 166
Obama revealed the existence of the secret Iranian enrichment facility in
the hopes of gaining additional leverage in the face-to-face negotiations
with Iran—which began on October 1, 2009 in Geneva, Switzerland—by
uniting the multilateral negotiating group against Iran. 167 Joined by the
other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—China, France,
Russia, and the United Kingdom—plus Germany (P5+1), the United States
offered to forestall efforts to impose increased sanctions in exchange for the
suspension of Iran’s nuclear enrichment. 168 While Iran did not agree to the
so-called “freeze for freeze” agenda, the Iranian delegation did agree in
principle to transfer a large amount of its enriched nuclear fuel to Russia
and France so that the outside countries could enrich it to be used by Iran
While some members of the Obama
for peaceful purposes. 169
Administration were cautiously optimistic about what Iran’s concessions
meant for breaking the stalemate, critics saw the concessions—coupled
with Iran’s refusal to suspend enrichment—as a cynical ploy to buy time to
avoid sanctions and continue enrichment.170
The critics were right. Iran very quickly reneged on its offer to ship its
enriched uranium abroad, 171 and the Obama Administration’s year-end
deadline for negotiations came and went without any progress. 172 In sum,
despite the President’s conciliatory attitude, the Iranian regime remained
intractable throughout the one-year timetable he imposed for
164. Id.
165. Jonathan Weisman et al., West Raps Iran Nuclear Site, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2009,
at A1.
166. Goldberg, supra note 18, at 65.
167. See Weisman et al., supra note 165.
168. Jay Solomon & Farnaz Fassihi, U.S. and Iran Make Offers on Nuclear Talks, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 1, 2009, at A11.
169. Marc Champion & Jay Solomon, Iran Agrees To Transfer Uranium Abroad, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 2, 2009, at A1.
170. See, e.g., id.
171. Chip Cummins et al., Iran Seeks to Alter Agreement, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, at
A13. The State Department documents released by WikiLeaks in 2010 show that President
Ahmadinejad was in favor of the deal, but was attacked by the Iranian Parliament. Jay
Solomon, Offers, Doubts Greet Iran Talks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2010, at A14. Iran’s
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei eventually sided against Ahmadinejad and scuttled
the deal. Id. The Austrian diplomat who was the source of this information reported that
“Iran’s failure to follow through . . . may have been due to a decision by Khamenei either
that the West was not trustworthy . . . or that Iran could get more.” Id.
172. Glenn Kessler, While Protests Roil Iran, U.S. Prepares Sanctions, WASH. POST, Dec.
30, 2009, at A1.
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negotiations. 173 Instead, Obama’s failed outreach was met with dilatory
tactics through which Iran bought valuable time in developing a nuclear
weapon. 174
B. Carrying a Big Stick?: The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
Toward the end of the one-year deadline for negotiations imposed by the
Obama Administration, members of Congress began to grow impatient with
both Iran and the Administration.175 Over the objections of some members
of the Administration, 176 both the Senate and the House introduced and
passed legislation that was meant to strengthen and expand sanctions
against Iran that were already in place,177 as well as to pressure the
Administration to use all the tools at its disposal to achieve results. 178 The
Administration successfully lobbied the House-Senate conference
committee to delay the completion of sanctions until it could finish its
efforts in persuading the U.N. Security Council to enact sanctions of their
House Bill 2194, The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
own. 179
Accountability, and Divestment Act, was passed overwhelmingly by both
houses on June 24, 2010. 180 The President signed it into law on July 1. 181
The Comprehensive Act greatly expands the scope of sanctionable
activities beyond previous law so as to include efforts by foreign firms to
(1) sell, lease, or provide to Iran any goods, services, technology,
information, or support that would allow Iran to maintain or expand its
petroleum refineries; and (2) supply refined petroleum products. 182 The
triggering threshold for supplying refined petroleum is a $1 million
transaction. 183 The Comprehensive Act requires that the above listed

173. See Matthew Lee, Clinton: New Sanctions on Iran Needed, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 14, 2009, available at http://www.iranenergyproject.org/303/clinton-new-sanctions-oniran-needed (quoting Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as remarking: “I don’t think anyone
can doubt that our outreach has produced very little in terms of any kind of a positive
response from the Iranians”).
174. See KATZMAN, supra note 19, at 23–24 (detailing Iran’s nuclear development
efforts).
175. Kevin Bogardus, Democratic Senators Frustrated with State Department on Iran,
THE HILL (Oct. 6, 2009), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/61921-dem-senatorsfrustrated-with-state-dept-on-iran.
176. See id.
177. See KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 16–23 (detailing the contents of the House and
Senate legislation in comparison to the final law).
178. See id. at 16 (stating that the House made its policy explicit in the House Bill by
stating that it “shall be U.S. policy to fully enforce” the ILSA).
179. Id. at 13.
180. Id.
181. Id.; see also supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
182. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-195, § 102, 124 Stat. 1312, 1317–19 (codified at amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701
note).
183. Id. at 1318.
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sanctionable activities “directly and significantly” assist Iran in developing
refining capability or in obtaining refined petroleum. 184
The Comprehensive Act further requires that the sanctionable activity be
done knowingly, defined as either with actual knowledge or where the party
“should have known, of the conduct, circumstances, or the result.” 185 The
constructive knowledge standard is also extended with respect to the
ownership and control of foreign subsidiaries by their American parent
corporations. 186 This is a significant extension of corporate liability from
the previous ILSA which held parent corporations liable only if they
approved and/or facilitated the prohibited activity. 187
These provisions have the potential of bringing many different
companies into violation of the law, including financial services companies,
telecommunications companies, shipping companies, insurance and
reinsurance companies, and steel companies.188 The question remains how
broadly this Administration and future administrations will construe these
provisions in determining which companies to investigate.
In light of the fact that only one investigation was conducted under the
ILSA, Congress has sought to strengthen the name-and-shame function of
the sanctions by mandating that the President initiate an investigation upon
the receipt of credible information that sanctionable conduct has occurred,
and that he report a determination to Congress within 180 days. 189 The
investigation provision was previously optional.190 The President was,
however, given some diplomatic leeway in conducting investigations by the
Comprehensive Act. For one, the investigations remain permissive, as
opposed to mandatory, until July 1, 2011, a year after the date of
enactment. 191 Thereafter, the President can request that the imposition of
mandatory investigations be delayed provided that the President gives
Congress written reports on the efficacy of his diplomatic efforts to prevent
184. Id. at 1317. The bill does not define the term “directly and significantly” so this
remains an important interpretive issue that must be addressed by the Administration. Id. at
1316–17 (the “directly and significantly” standard is not included in the Act’s definition
section).
185. Id. at 1317.
186. Id. at 1320. If American corporations are in fact sanctioned for the activities of their
foreign subsidiaries, it will be interesting to see how courts apply the constructive knowledge
standard in interpreting how much knowledge parent corporations should have for the acts of
their subsidiaries. A discussion of the possible interpretations, however, is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
187. Additional Information for the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067,
66,068 (Dec. 16, 1996).
188. See Solomon et al., supra note 3. Although this Comment focuses on the impact and
efficacy of energy sanctions, the Comprehensive Act also imposes new restrictions
implemented by the Treasury department on both domestic and foreign financial institutions,
freezing out of the American financial system those companies that transact with or perform
financial services for any blacklisted Iranian institution designated for sanction (for example
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Central Bank of Iran, and the state-run entities of
the energy sector). Id.; see also § 102, 124 Stat. at 1331–35.
189. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1327.
190. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.
191. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1326–28.
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parties and governments from engaging in sanctionable activities.192
Furthermore, under an additional diplomatic carve-out called the “Special
Rule,” the President is not required to investigate a party that is no longer
engaging in the activity at issue or has taken significant steps toward
stopping the activity. 193
In the event the President actually initiate an investigation, either
voluntarily or by mandate, the Comprehensive Act, at least in theory, has
made it more difficult for the President to issue a waiver for a company in
violation. Under the previous legislation, the President could issue a waiver
if it was “important” to the United States national interest.194 The
Comprehensive Act amends that provision, requiring that the President may
only issue a waiver if it is “necessary” to the national interest. 195 Of course,
given that no President has issued a waiver since the sanctions for the Total
S.A. project were waived in 1998, 196 the increased standard may have little
observable effect.
Additionally, the Comprehensive Act now requires the President to
impose three different sanctions on violating companies, 197 and has added
three new sanctions to the previous menu of six from which he must
choose. 198 If implemented, the three new sanctions have the possibility to
impose a great deal of economic harm on global firms who violate the
United States’s sanctions policies. The new sanctions are: (1) prohibition
on foreign exchange transactions subject to United States’s jurisdiction; (2)
prohibition on transfers of credit or payment between, by, through, or to
financial institutions that are subject to United States’s jurisdiction; and (3)
prohibition on transacting or exercising any right, power, or privilege with
respect to property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.199
In terms of preventing public taxpayers’ dollars from enriching
companies in violation of the sanctions, the law contains a provision
requiring companies seeking U.S. Government procurement contracts to
certify, by conducting an internal evaluation, that neither they nor any
Furthermore, the
subsidiary engages in sanctionable activity. 200
Comprehensive Act establishes a framework giving state and local
governments the authority to implement divestment laws that prohibit the
use of public funds such as pension funds and endowments to invest in, or
do business with, companies that invest in Iran’s energy sector. 201 To

192. Id. at 1326–27.
193. Id. at 1325.
194. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
195. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1322.
196. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
197. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1317–18.
198. Id. at 1320–21; see also supra note 93.
199. Id. at 1321.
200. Id. at 1321–22; see also supra note 148 and accompanying text.
201. Id. at 1341–43. By providing a framework for state and local governments to divest
from companies investing in Iran’s energy sector, and providing further that such regulations
will not be preempted by any federal law or regulation, id. at 1343, Congress prevented
certain constitutional preemption challenges to the state and local ordinances.
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further encourage divestment from companies enriching the Iranian regime,
the Comprehensive Act provides a safe harbor provision for asset managers
by preventing shareholders and trustees from suing them for either
divesting from or avoiding investing in companies that violate the
Comprehensive Act. 202
In sum, on the surface the amended sets of sanctions are clearly intended
to force foreign firms to choose between either doing business with Iran, or
losing all economic interest in and with the United States. 203
C. An International Consensus Tentatively Emerges
As part of his strategy of engagement with Iran, President Obama has
sought to build a unified multilateral coalition in both negotiating and
applying pressure on Iran. 204 In that regard, the Obama Administration is

In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), the Supreme Court
held that a Massachusetts statute that barred state entities from buying goods and services
from any party indentified on a state-compiled list as doing business with Burma (Myanmar)
was preempted by a statute later passed by Congress directing sanctions at Burma. Id. at 388.
The Court reasoned that the Massachusetts law prohibited some activity the federal law
allowed, and allowed some activity the federal law prohibited. Id. at 376. As such, the Court
found that the Massachusetts law was “an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s full
objectives under the federal Act,” because it took away some of the President’s discretion in
applying the diplomatic leverage Congress specifically intended. Id. at 373. The Divestment
section of the Comprehensive Act seems written with Crosby in mind.
On a related note, the Insurance Commission of California has begun to require insurance
companies that operate in California to disclose their dealings with Iran and companies that
invest in Iran. Jaime L. Brockway, California Insurance Commissioner Sues to Stop Iran
Investments,
INS.
&
FIN.
ADVISOR
(Nov.
15,
2010),
http://ifawebnews.com/2010/11/15/california-insurance-commissioner-sues-to-stop-iraninvestments. The Commission has prohibited any such company from selling insurance in
California. Former Insurance Commissioner Steve Poizner claimed legal authority to do so,
stating that “[s]ince companies doing business with Iran face financial risk, I have the
authority to protect insurer portfolios from investments in those companies.” Id. To date
more than one thousand insurance companies in California have agreed to forgo business
with the list of fifty companies promulgated by Poizner’s office as doing business with Iran’s
energy, nuclear, and military sectors. Id. Additionally, the California Insurance Commission
has disqualified some $6 billion in holdings by insurance companies in those fifty blacklisted
companies. Id.
Because the insurance premiums of private citizens do not seem to fall under the
definition of assets that states are authorized to divest under the Comprehensive Act, it does
not appear as if California’s regulations would fall under the authorized umbrella of the
statute. See § 102, 124 Stat. at 1341–43. As a result, the regulations could raise some
preemption challenges under Crosby.
202. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1343–44; cf. Amy Deen Westbrook, What’s In Your Portfolio?
U.S. Investors Are Unknowingly Financing State Sponsors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
1151 (2010) (detailing how U.S. investment dollars capitalize companies that do business
with state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran).
203. See Solomon et al., supra note 3 (quoting Representative Ron Klein (D-FL), one of
the Comprehensive Act’s original sponsors, as stating: “Foreign companies are going to
have to make a choice: Do they want to do business with us or with the Iranians?”).
204. See Remarks on Signing the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, supra note 2.
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having more success than previous administrations in getting international
allies to go along with the latest round of sanctions.205
On June 9, 2010, the U.N. Security Council passed a binding resolution
to take aim at Iran’s ability to develop weapons of mass destruction, while
targeting Iran’s conventional military and Revolutionary Guard Corps for
the first time. 206 The United States wanted to target Iran’s financial,
insurance, and other industries, but China and Russia—permanent members
of the Security Council with absolute vetoes over all resolutions—insisted
that sanctions not impact Iran’s day-to-day economy or foreign trade.207
The United States was, however, able to insert some language in the
preamble to the resolution which mentions the link between Iranian Central
Bank and Iran’s energy sector revenues and the regime’s proliferation
activities. 208 American officials argued that such language was broad
enough to sanction companies dealing with both the Central Bank and the
energy sector. 209 This gave President Obama the imprimatur of the U.N. to
sign off on harsh the sanctions passed by Congress, and to encourage allies
to do the same. 210
In contrast to the debacle President Clinton faced when trying to
convince Europe to join the sanctions against Iran,211 the European Union
followed on the heels of the passage of the Comprehensive Act in July 2010
with robust sanctions of its own. 212 While they do not go so far as to ban
importing oil and gas from Iran, or exporting refined petroleum (i.e.,
gasoline) to Iran, 213 European sanctions are similar to the American ones in
that they ban European companies from investing in Iran’s energy sector as
well as selling goods and services to Iran that could be used in developing
its energy sector. 214 Furthermore, the EU sanctions contain measures to
deny Iran access to financial markets, freeze the assets of certain targeted
individuals and entities, and comprehensively ban all military equipment.215
Because the EU is Iran’s largest partner, the EU measures have a good
chance of having a significant impact. 216
To date—in addition to the European Union—Japan, South Korea,
Canada, and Australia have all enacted measures to restrict investment in
205. See John Pomfret, Chinese Firms Bypass Sanctions on Iran, U.S. Says, WASH. POST,
Oct. 18, 2010, at A1 (“The Obama [A]ministration has cobbled together a growing network
of countries and companies that have announced measures to cut investments in Iran.”).
206. See KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 41–42, 45–48 (detailing the provisions of the U.N.
sanctions resolutions).
207. Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Approves New Sanctions To Deter Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2010, at A1.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See supra Part I.B.2.
212. Stephen Castle, Europe Toughens Penalties on Iran for Nuclear Work, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 2010, at A7.
213. See KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 43, 45–48.
214. See id. at 45.
215. See id. at 46–48.
216. Castle, supra note 212.
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Iran’s energy sector. 217 Thanks to these new sanctions, many of Iran’s
suppliers of refined petroleum have ceased business with Iran, and many of
the companies investing in its energy sector have either pulled out or are
winding down their operations. 218 As a result, China has become Iran’s last
major remaining trading partner still willing to do oil and gas deals.219
D. Preliminary Implementation
On September 30, 2010, after its first round of investigations pursuant to
the Comprehensive Act, the State Department announced that it was
imposing sanctions on the Switzerland-based Naftiran Intertrade Company,
a wholly owned subsidiary of an Iranian state-owned company. 220 During
the same briefing, the State Department announced that four major
European oil companies had pledged to end their investment in Iran’s
energy sector. 221 Such a pledge brought the four companies under the
“Special Rule” of the Comprehensive Act, which allows companies to
avoid sanctions by making assurances that they will end their
investments. 222
Although encouraged by the Administration’s willingness to actually use
the sanctions that are available, many lawmakers on Capitol Hill remain
more concerned with the companies that were not included in the sanctions
than the one that was.223 The Administration, however, has countered such
concerns by reiterating that the purpose of the Comprehensive Act is not
necessarily to impose sanctions per se, but rather to use them as credible
diplomatic leverage in encouraging countries and companies to pull out of

217. Pomfret, supra note 205.
218. See Energy-Related Companies Ending Iran Ties, FOUND. FOR DEF. OF
DEMOCRACIES: THE IRAN ENERGY PROJECT, http://www.iranenergyproject.org/companiescutting-ties-with-iran.pdf (last updated Sept. 23, 2010).
219. See Pomfret, supra note 205.
220. Rogin, supra note 31; see also James Steinberg, Deputy Sec’y of State, Briefing on
Iran
Sanctions
Act
Implementation
(Sept.
30,
2010),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/s/d/2010/148479.htm.
221. Steinberg, supra note 220 (identifying the four companies as Total S.A. of France,
Statoil of Norway, Eni of Italy, and Royal Dutch Shell of the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands).
222. Steinberg, supra note 220 (“These companies have provided assurances to us that
they have stopped or are taking significant verifiable steps to stop their activity in Iran and
have provided assurances not to undertake new energy-related activity in Iran that may be
sanctionable.”); see also Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, § 102, 124 Stat. 1312, 1325 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 note). The exact language of the “Special Rule” provides that the President need not
investigate a party that “is no longer engaging in the [sanctionable] activity or has taken
significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and . . . the President has received
reliable assurances that the [party] will not knowingly engage in [a sanctionable activity] in
the future.” Id; see also supra note 193 and accompanying text.
223. See Rogin, supra note 31 (quoting a joint statement from Senators Joseph Lieberman
(I-CT), Susan Collins (R-ME), and Jon Kyl (R-AZ): “We are particularly concerned that the
majority of the companies that . . . [are] still selling gasoline to Iran are in China. We urge
the Administration to complete its own investigations swiftly and enforce the sanctions law,
comprehensively and aggressively, against any violators.”).

2011]

U.S. ENERGY SANCTIONS & IRAN

2373

Iran. 224 Thus, the Administration will apply the formal sanctions available
to it only after all diplomatic options have been exhausted.225
The Obama Administration has reportedly been engaged in diplomatic
talks with China to persuade China’s companies to end their business ties
with Iran, which are enabling the regime in Tehran to skirt sanctions. 226 If
the Chinese are not forced to end their investment in Iran, or worse, if they
take over projects abandoned by companies in countries that are complying
with the sanctions, there is great concern that the tentative consensus
toward sanctions could crumble. 227
Nevertheless, the preliminary results of the sanctions demonstrate that
they are beginning to have their desired effect. According to members of
the Obama Administration who testified before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs on December 1, 2010, the sanctions have caused an eightyfive percent drop in refined petroleum imports into Iran, and have cost Iran
close to $60 billion in foreign energy investments, as well as the technology
and expertise that come with them. 228 Furthermore, Iran has been almost
entirely frozen out of the international financial system. 229 Iran has
suffered significant economic difficulties since the passage of the
multilateral sanctions with fears of inflation rising and their currency—the
rial—becoming devalued. 230 There are signs of domestic unrest as the
Iranian middle class is blaming the regime for the economic difficulties.231
And, as a sign that the sanctions are not just harming Iran economically but
causing changes in behavior, the pressures from the sanctions have caused
Iran to cut back its funding for the terror group Hezbollah by more than
forty percent. 232
224. See Steinberg, supra note 220 (“I found a chance to talk with a number of members
of Congress who have been very positive about the actions that we’ve taken. We’ve acted
fully in accordance with law. And what they understand is that the goal here is not to
impose sanctions for sanctions’ sake, but to end companies from doing business within Iran.
And so we believe the model that we would like to see every company follow, is to follow
the model taken by the four European firms.”).
225. See id.
226. See Pomfret, supra note 205; see also Steinberg, supra note 220.
227. See Pomfret, supra note 205 (quoting a senior U.S. official as stating: “What the
Japanese and European companies are most concerned about is that they’ve left projects that
are real prizes in Iran. Their biggest concern is stepping away under pressure and having the
Chinese go in.”). But see Steinberg, supra note 220 (“[I]n addition to our encouragement of
people not to undertake so-called backfill type activities, we obviously make it clear to
others the potential consequences if their firms were to do that in a way that would violate
[the Comprehensive Act].”).
228. Implementing Tougher Sanctions on Iran: A Progress Report: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 14–15 (2010) (statement of William J. Burns,
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs).
229. Id. at 22–24 (statement of Stuart A. Levey, Undersecretary of Treasury for Terrorism
and Financial Intelligence).
230. Id. at 32.
231. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 50–51.
232. Yaakov Katz, Iran Said To Have Cut Hizbullah Aid by 40%, JERUSALEM POST, Dec.
16, 2010, at 2 (“Iran has in recent years provided Hizbullah with close to $1 billion in direct
military aid, but due to the impact of the recent round of international sanctions, the Islamic
Republic has been forced to cut back on the funding. The money is used by Hizbullah to
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When Iran agreed to meet with the P5+1 to negotiate for the first time in
over a year in December 2010, the Obama Administration became
cautiously optimistic that the sanctions were beginning to force the Iranian
regime to accept that continuing nuclear development was not worth the
severe costs imposed by the sanctions. 233 Iran remained intransigent at the
talks, however, as its negotiator insisted that Iran would never give up its
right to nuclear enrichment.234 The Obama Administration left the
negotiations promising to test “Iran’s pain threshold” by refusing to allow
Iran’s disingenuous efforts of negotiating to undermine the even tougher
application of sanctions.235
It remains to be seen how the Obama Administration balances all of the
diplomatic concerns that a successful implementation entails, and whether
Congressional pressure will have any impact on the Administration’s
execution of the Comprehensive Act. Moreover, the true measure of the
Comprehensive Act’s success will not be in the number of companies that
end their investment in Iran, but rather in the costs the sanctions exact on
the Iranian regime. The metric for success requires that the Iranians
permanently suspend nuclear development.
III. ISSUES IN EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Given its sweeping nature and extraterritorial focus, the Comprehensive
Act is certain to face a number of inherent structural challenges as it is
interpreted and applied by the executive branch going forward. This part
critically analyzes the legal, political, and endemic policy challenges that
the Comprehensive Act may face if it is to be implemented as the 111th
Congress intended.

buy advanced weaponry, train and pay its operatives and establish military positions and
sustain them throughout Lebanon.”).
233. See Glenn Kessler, Clinton Vows ‘Good Faith’ Talks with Iran, WASH. POST, Dec. 4,
2010, at A8.
234. Glenn Kessler, Little Progress Seen as Talks with Iran Come to End, WASH. POST,
Dec. 8, 2010, at A9. One senior U.S. official stated that the talks were accompanied by a fair
amount of “Iranian venting and posturing.” Id.
235. David E. Sanger, Harder Push To Stop Iran from Making Nuclear Fuel, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2010, at A6. Aside from the precarious economic condition in which the sanctions
have placed the Iranian regime, the P5+1 may have more leverage over Iran now that it has
been revealed that the Iranian nuclear development facilities suffered major setbacks when a
computer worm known as Stuxnet caused Iranian centrifuges to stop working. David
Crawford & Jay Solomon, Report Says Computer Worm Stymied Iran Nuclear Sites, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 24, 2010, at A13. On November 29, 2010, the Iranian nuclear program was
targeted by another seemingly covert attack when two separate car bombs killed one
prominent Iranian nuclear scientist and injured another. Farnaz Fassihi, Bombs Target
Iranian Nuclear Scientists, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2010, at A15.

2011]

U.S. ENERGY SANCTIONS & IRAN

2375

A. Legal Barriers to Effective Implementation: Limits to Prescriptive
Jurisdiction
1. Limits from Customary International Law
Prior to the enactment of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, economic
sanctions either directly targeted Iran by preventing the importation of
Iranian oil into the United States,236 or targeted American corporations by
preventing them from investing in Iran. 237 The Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act—and the Comprehensive Act which amended it—intentionally went
beyond domestic enforcement by targeting the overseas activities of foreign
firms to force those firms to choose between doing business with Iran and
having access to American markets. 238 This section analyzes whether, in
practice, any potential domestic U.S. legal barriers exist to the prospective
implementation of the sanctions regime.
It is well settled that Congress has the power under the U.S. Constitution
to enact laws that regulate conduct occurring extraterritorially. 239 The
Constitution specifically grants Congress broad power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and one component of this grant is the
power to regulate commerce that occurs beyond U.S. territory. 240 Congress
has used this power to regulate activity of non-U.S. citizens beyond its
borders in such substantive areas as antitrust, foreign corrupt practices, and
economic sanctions. 241
Under international law, however, a state’s power to regulate an actor’s
conduct is subject to the limitations of its prescriptive—or legislative—
Presently, American courts limit the extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 242
jurisdictional reach of American laws based on the “effects doctrine,”
which posits that a country may only regulate conduct of foreign nationals
that occurs outside that country’s territory if such conduct “has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory.” 243 Even if such
236. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
238. See supra Parts I.B, II.B.
239. See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 2–3 (1992); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991) (“Both parties concede, as they must, that Congress has the authority to enforce its
laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”).
240. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Born, supra note 239, at 4.
241. See RODMAN, supra note 92, at 32.
242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(a) (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] (defining prescriptive jurisdiction as the power “to make its law applicable to
the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of person in things, whether by
legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by
determination of a court”).
243. RESTATEMENT, supra note 242, at § 402; see, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences
within its borders which the state reprehends.”).
Throughout much of U.S. history, however, American courts extended the jurisdiction of
American laws based on a more limited doctrine of public international law known as the
territorial principle, which holds that absent consent, a state’s sovereignty is exclusive within
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substantial effects are found however, the jurisdictional reach of American
laws should not be extended extraterritorially if doing so would be
unreasonable to the extent that another state has greater interest in
regulating the activity. 244
According to the Charming Betsy canon of statutory construction,
American courts will not apply a statute in a manner that violates customary
international law, absent Congress’s clear intent to do so. 245
Notwithstanding the limitations on Congress’s prescriptive jurisdiction
imposed by customary international law, however, it is well settled that
Congress possesses the power to enact statutes that violate principles of
customary international law. 246 Thus, in U.S. courts or other domestic fora,
federal legislation will override any inconsistent rules of international law,
including rules that place limits on the jurisdictional reach of statutes.
As such, when examining whether courts will subject a statute to a
customary international law analysis under the effects doctrine, one must
look to the statute itself for the unambiguous intent of Congress to extend
the law to conduct of non-U.S. citizens outside of the United States. 247 In
the case of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act and the subsequent
Comprehensive Act, the intent of Congress is clear. The laws were drafted
to specifically regulate the activities of non-U.S. parties conducting
business with Iran. 248 Hence, regardless of whether or not the sanctions are
impermissibly extraterritorial under the effects doctrine analysis, Congress
its territory. RODMAN, supra note 92, at 30–31. Any attempt by a foreign power to extend its
laws extraterritorially represented a violation of the state’s territorial sovereignty to enact
laws as it sees fit. Id. at 31. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated the legal doctrine
succinctly in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.—a case in which the Court refused
to apply the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to the United Fruit Company for its activities in Costa
Rica and Panama—stating that “the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.” 213 U.S. 347, 356
(1909). The more permissive effects doctrine phased out the territorial principle after World
War II as American economic interests became more and more globalized and American
policy makers sought to have those worldwide interests protected by American law.
RODMAN, supra note 92, at 30–31.
244. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 242, at § 403; see also Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976).
245. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“An act of
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains. . . .”); see also F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S.
155, 164 (2004) (limiting extraterritorial application of prescriptive jurisdiction in an
ambiguous statute); RESTATEMENT, supra note 242, at § 114 (“Where fairly possible, a
United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an
international agreement of the United States.”).
246. See Born, supra note 239, at 5; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Federal courts must give effect to a valid,
unambiguous congressional mandate, even if such effect would conflict with another
nation’s laws or violate international law.”); RESTATEMENT, supra note 242, at § 403 cmt. g
(“If construction of a statute that accommodates the intent of Congress within the limits of
international law is not fairly possible, the statute is nevertheless valid . . . .”).
247. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Congress has the
authority to enforce its law beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. Whether
Congress has in fact exercised that authority . . . is a matter of statutory construction.”).
248. See supra Parts I.B, II.B.
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validly has the authority to regulate the activities of foreign interests doing
business with Iran’s energy sector.
2. Constitutional Limits
Although it must be granted that Congress has the constitutional
authority to pass extraterritorial sanctions laws, the Constitution may
nonetheless prevent their specific application in certain instances.
According to Gary B. Born’s comprehensive survey on the subject, “either
the Due Process Clause or the Foreign Commerce Clause might preclude
extension of federal law to conduct abroad that has only de minimis contact
with or effect upon the United States or its nationals.” 249 Pursuant to this
standard, the Constitution may prevent sanctions from being enforced upon
parties that do not have a sufficient presence in the United States or whose
activities—in this case conducting energy-related transactions with Iran—
do not have sufficient effects on the United States or its nationals.
Analyzing the minimum contacts prong of the standard with respect to
the Comprehensive Act, it is clear that each of the nine sanctions options,
on their face, are designed to affect a sanctioned party’s contact with the
U.S. economy. 250 It follows, therefore, that in order for a targeted sanction
to be effectively punitive under the Comprehensive Act, the U.S.
government must deprive a party of its economic interests in the United
States and thus, a fortiori, the sanctioned party must have previously
“purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the [United States].” 251 Thus, each of the sanctions, by their very nature
would pass a deferential de minimis contacts test.
With respect to the effects prong of the constitutional limitation, Iran’s
history of bellicosity, which has only increased in recent years as it has
raced to develop nuclear weapons and undermine the United States’s
expanded presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, has had a destabilizing effect
on American interests and has cost American blood and treasure.252 In
drafting the sanctions, Congress explicitly drew a link between the Iranian
regime’s ability to conduct energy transactions and its ability to develop
nuclear weapons and support terrorist groups.253 Thus, insofar as the

249. Born, supra note 239, at 5–6. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
limits the assertion of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants in federal courts who do
not have sufficient minimum contacts with the United States. See Republic of Arg. v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619–20 (1992) (applying a Fifth Amendment minimum
contacts test to a foreign defendant to establish personal jurisdiction in a case arising under a
federal statute); Born, supra note 239, at 6 n.16. Similarly, legislation which sought to
regulate commerce abroad that had no meaningful connection to the United States could
ostensibly be challenged as exceeding Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce
Clause. Born, supra note 239, at 6 n.16.
250. See supra notes 93, 199 and accompanying text.
251. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 620 (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
252. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
253. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 3, 110 Stat. 1541,
1541–42 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note). The preamble to United Nations
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fundamental purpose of the extraterritorial sanctions laws is to counteract
and eliminate the Iranian regime’s ability to harm American lives and
interests by punishing the countries and companies that give Iran the
funding to do so, the government should prevail in meeting the deferential
de minimus effects test as well.
That said, federal courts have never imposed restraints on the specific
application of extraterritorial laws by finding them unconstitutional,254 and
only a few lower federal courts have even alluded in dicta to such a
possibility. 255 Thus, foreign parties sanctioned under the Comprehensive
Act are unlikely to find any legal protection—either from the domestic
application of customary international law or the prohibitions of the
Constitution.
B. Political Barriers to Effective Implementation
1. The Inter-Branch Conflict: A Classic Problem of Foreign Relations Law
In comparison to the delineated roles the Constitution assigns to the
executive and legislative branches of government in the domestic sphere,
the Constitution says relatively little in defining and separating the roles of
the two political branches in managing the country’s foreign affairs.256
Accordingly, there is often considerable overlap between the powers of
Congress and the President when it comes to setting policy for the United
States in foreign affairs. 257 As a result, inter-branch conflicts between the
Security Council Resolution 1929, which preceded passage of the Comprehensive Act, also
drew such a link. See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text.
254. See RODMAN, supra note 92, at 32; Born supra note 239, at 6.
255. Born supra note 239, at 6; see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49
(9th Cir. 1990); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leb.), 730 F.2d 1103, 1107 n.11 (7th Cir. 1984);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
256. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 141 (3d
ed. 2009) (“Constitutional text does not explicitly address many important issues concerning
the foreign relations authority of the federal political branches.”); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984, at 201 (Randall Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)
(“[T]he Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers capable of
affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy.”); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67 (1990) (“One cannot read the Constitution without
being struck by its astonishing brevity regarding the allocation of foreign affairs authority
among the branches.”).
Article I grants Congress the power to declare war, raise armies, regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and define and punish offenses against the law of nations (i.e. customary
international law). U.S. CONST. art. I. Article II of the Constitution makes the President the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, grants him the power appoint ambassadors, and,
with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, gives the President the power to
make treaties. U.S. CONST. art. II.
257. See KOH, supra note 256, at 67 (“[T]he document grants clearly related powers to
separate institutions, without ever specifying the relationship between those powers, as for
example, with Congress’s power to declare war and the President’s power as commander-inchief.”); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
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President and Congress have led to many of the constitutional controversies
in foreign affairs law since the time of the founding. 258 This section
analyzes the constitutional inter-branch conflicts created by the
Comprehensive Act.
Whereas a paradigmatic inter-branch conflict in foreign affairs law
occurs when the President has acted without the express authorization of
Congress or the Constitution, 259 the past, present, and future
implementation of the Iran sanctions laws presents the converse problem:
Presidential inaction conflicting with Congressional mandates. On the one
hand Congress has the power under the Foreign Commerce Clause to pass
laws to punish trade with Iran, 260 and the President has the constitutional
duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”261 On the other
hand, the President is the country’s chief diplomat and, as such, responsible
for the conduct of the United States’s foreign relations—an area beyond the
institutional competency of Congress.262

of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain.”).
258. For instance, during the Neutrality Controversy of 1793, President George
Washington was adamant that the United States stay out of the war that had broken out
between Revolutionary France and the rest of Europe. BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note
256, at 12–13. Washington’s cabinet debated whether or not the President—consistent with
his powers under the Constitution—had the authority to issue a proclamation of neutrality.
Id.
Arguing in the newspapers in the pseudonymous Pacificus-Helvidius debate, Alexander
Hamilton (Pacificus) posited that the Constitution vested a unitary executive power in the
President, and among the powers traditionally understood as executive was the power to
serve as “the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign Nations.” Id. at 14. As
such, the prerogative to declare the country neutral in foreign conflicts belonged to the
President. Id. at 15–16.
In contrast, James Madison (Helvidius) argued that with the power declare war, also came
the power to choose to not go to war. Id. at 16–18. The Constitution gave Congress the
power to declare war, and it therefore followed that the President needed an act of Congress
to make an official proclamation of neutrality. Id.
Washington issued a proclamation of neutrality, but, perhaps to mollify concerns about
its constitutionality, never included the word neutrality in the proclamation. Id. at 13.
259. See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (holding that the President’s Commander-inChief powers did not grant him authority to seize a steel mill during the Korean War when
Congress had declined to give him such power through legislation); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804) (holding that the executive lacked the authority to seize
American vessels sailing away from French ports when Congress had only authorized the
President to seize American vessels sailing to French ports); Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp.
2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing a suit by thirty-two members of Congress against the
President over whether the President could withdraw from a treaty without the authorization
of Congress).
260. See supra notes 239–41 and accompanying text.
261. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
262. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“In this
vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . .
Congress itself is powerless to invade it. . . . The President is the sole organ of the nation in
its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power
over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 253–54 (2001) (arguing that the Founders intended
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It is in this respect that the constitutional conflict between the President
and Congress has arisen over extraterritorial sanctions. While Congress has
wanted to see that the laws it passes are enforced,263 the President has been
reluctant to involve the United States in a trade imbroglio with foreign
nations. 264
Due to separation of powers concerns, courts are hesitant to get involved
in settling the disputes between the political branches. For one, a lack of
standing will prevent members of Congress from suing to enjoin the
President to enforce the sanctions.265 Additionally, following the political
question doctrine, courts are reluctant to interject themselves into
controversies between the President and Congress in political matters such
as how the President is exercising his discretion in carrying out a law in the
Consequently, given the institutional
realm of foreign affairs. 266
advantages of the executive branch in foreign affairs, 267 successive
Presidents have thus far seized wide discretion in choosing to not
investigate companies and enforce sanctions as prescribed by law.268
2. Past Precedent: The ILSA & Presidential Inaction
Going back to the first passage of the Act, between the time of its
enactment in August 1996 and the May 1998 issuance of a national-interest
waiver by the Clinton Administration, only one investment deal drew the
investigative scrutiny of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act: the Total S.A.
investment to which the State Department granted the waivers.269 With
respect to the Total S.A. deal, Representative Benjamin Gilman, the lead
for all foreign affairs powers not specifically delegated to Congress to be exclusively
executive).
263. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
265. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (holding that Congressmen lacked
standing to challenge the Line-Item Veto Act as unconstitutional because they had not
suffered a legally cognizable injury); Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 6–12 (following Raines,
dismissed suit by Congressmen for lack of standing).
266. The political question doctrine dates back to the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison
in which Chief Justice John Marshall stated that some government actions are “mere
political act[s]” and are therefore not “examinable in a court of justice.” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 164–65 (1803). The political question doctrine is often invoked in cases in which
courts refuse to exercise jurisdiction in suits involving foreign affairs. See BRADLEY &
GOLDSMITH, supra note 256, at 58. In Goldwater v. Carter, Justice William Rehnquist
argued that a suit by Senator Goldwater concerning the President’s power to abrogate a
treaty should be dismissed as a nonjusticiable political question “because it involves the
authority of the President in the conduct of our country’s foreign relations and the extent to
which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President.” 444
U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
267. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 256, at 173 (discussing the executive
branch’s institutional advantage as having control over “a massive bureaucracy devoted to
foreign affairs”); CORWIN, supra note 256, at 201 (positing that the executive’s institutional
advantages over Congress include “the unity of the office, its capacity for secrecy and
dispatch, and its superior sources of information; to which should be added . . . that it is
always on hand and ready for action”).
268. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
269. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 289.

2011]

U.S. ENERGY SANCTIONS & IRAN

2381

House sponsor of the law, 270 tried to assert congressional authority in the
face of presidential inaction. 271 Using the unambiguous language of the
Constitution, Gilman stated: “Mr. President, refusing to enforce the law in
this case is not an option, not least because your oath of office requires you
to see that the law is faithfully executed.”272 In spite of Gilman’s
admonitions, however, once it became clear that President Clinton and his
successors were not willing to risk international trade disputes to enforce
sanctions against foreign companies, the threat of sanctions lost
credibility. 273 Foreign investment in Iran returned to normal. 274
Subsequently, as required by the ILSA, the State Department reported to
Congress every six months on the developments of the ILSA, frequently
noting that U.S. diplomats had raised concerns with companies and their
parent governments about investing in Iran. 275 Yet, no companies were
specifically mentioned, nor were any investment projects published in the
Federal Register as required by the law. 276 As such, the formal
investigation and reporting procedures of the ILSA were never
subsequently implemented, nor was the President ever forced to issue
another waiver of sanctions. 277 Hence, the public and political pressure that
would have been placed on the President to sanction companies in violation
never manifested itself due in part to the structural loopholes of the law.
3. Congressional Initiative: Signs of a Change?
Congress sought to close some of the loopholes in the law by reducing
executive discretion and making certain other provisions mandatory. As
amended, the law now requires the Administration to initiate an
investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions upon the receipt of
“credible information” that a party is engaged in sanctionable activity.278
Further, once an investigation has been initiated, the President must
determine within 180 days whether the party under investigation is eligible
for sanctions and notify Congress of its determination. 279 Congress did
give the President some diplomatic flexibility by allowing President to
avoid investigating a party if the party stops, or takes significant steps to
stop, the sanctionable activity. 280
If the President does in fact follow the letter of the law and investigates
companies investing in Iran’s energy sector or selling refined petroleum to
Iran, the law now mandates that the President impose at least three different
270. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 299.
271. Id. at 329.
272. Id.
273. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 287.
274. Id. at 289.
275. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 6.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 20–21.
278. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-195, § 102, 124 Stat. 1312, 1325 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note).
279. Id.
280. Id.
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sanctions on the violating party. 281 Furthermore, whereas when Secretary
of State Albright issued a waiver of sanctions in 1998 she had to justify that
doing so was “important to the national interest,” 282 as currently amended,
the President may only waive sanctions now if it is “necessary to the
national interest,” and further if the President provides a detailed report to
Congress on the party’s prohibited activities. 283 This may not prevent the
President from waiving sanctions, but it will provide the Administration
less leeway in justifying its waivers to Congress and the public.284
In spite of the stricter language of the sanctions as amended by the
Comprehensive Act, the Administration is still free to implement the law at
its discretion based on its own independent interpretation of the law. For
instance, in the State Department’s first public briefing on how it was
implementing the extraterritorial sanctions of the Comprehensive Act on
September 30, 2010, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg attempted
to allay congressional concern that the Administration was not sanctioning
firms with significant ties to Iran. 285 Steinberg stated that some of the
instances did not reach the “threshold question about whether there’s
credible evidence of sanctionable activity.” 286 Moreover, Steinberg alluded
to ongoing negotiations with companies and their home countries about
withdrawing from Iran. 287
As of this writing, no foreign company that is not wholly-owned by Iran
has been sanctioned by the Administration, despite the purported limits on
the President’s discretion. Hence, Congress’s attempt to set policy through
its legislative powers failed again to overcome the President’s diplomatic
supremacy in shaping foreign affairs policy. Alternatively, for Congress to
see its policies effectively implemented, it can still bring to bear upon the
President its institutional powers of political pressure, oversight, and
investigation.
In the months since the passage of the Comprehensive Act, the
Congressional committees with jurisdictional oversight for the sanctions—
including the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs—have conducted
hearings in which members of the Administration had to answer for the
manner in which the executive branch was implementing the
Comprehensive Act. Moving forward, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(R-FL), the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the 112th
281. Id. at 1319.
282. See supra notes 94, 127 and accompanying text.
283. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1322.
284. See Lauren Rozen, Congress Cool to Iran Sanctions Waivers, POLITICO (June 11,
2010, 2:01 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/0610/Congress_cool_to_Iran
_sanctions_waivers.html (quoting Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD), stating: “The president wants,
as any president wants, flexibility in this legislation, and I understand why they want
that. . . . But this is a situation and this is an issue where we are not going to give them all
the waivers they want . . . . It can be helpful for the administration to say ‘well, I wish I
could do something, but Congress is independent and they have required this.’”).
285. Steinberg, supra note 220.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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Congress, has stated that Iran will be the Committee’s “No. 1, No. 2 and
No. 3 priority,” and has expressed a keen interest in using the Committee’s
oversight powers to reverse the trend that has seen “[t]he bills that we pass
become interesting historical documents but not really bills that have been
implemented.” 288 Additionally, outside of the formal committee structure,
several members of the House have formed a bipartisan Working Group on
Iran Sanctions Implementation in order to hold the Administration to
account for effectively implementing the sanctions, 289 while numerous
senators have taken the Administration to task for its evasiveness in
implementing the legislation. 290
All told, the legislators who have sought to get out in front of this issue
have done so with an understanding of the institutional weakness of
Congress in the realm of foreign relations laws. 291 In the words of Senator
Christopher Dodd (D-CT), the lead Senate sponsor of the Comprehensive
Act, “as a coequal branch of government . . . we delegate to the
administration and the executive branch to conduct foreign policy, and you
can’t have 535 Members of Congress conducting foreign policy, I
understand that point.” 292 Nonetheless, it is clear from the tone of the
members of both houses of Congress, from both political parties, that the
legislative branch has found a renewed seriousness in seeing that foreign
companies do not violate American sanctions laws with impunity. It
remains to be seen whether the political pressure coming from Congress
will have any effect on how the Administration conducts its diplomacy and
implements the law.
C. Endemic Barriers to Effective Implementation
Questions remain as to whether the multilateral energy sanctions regime
the United States and its allies have constructed have, by their very nature,
any possibility of being successful in bringing Iran back to the negotiating
table over its nuclear programs. The endemic issues the sanctions policy
faces are two-tiered: (1) sanctions of this kind have not been enforced in
the past and therefore lack the credibility to serve as a future deterrent; and
(2) even if the sanctions do sufficiently deter investment in Iran, they are
288. Bridget Johnson, The World from the Hill: Iran ‘No. 1’ on Agenda for Foreign
Affairs Panel Leader, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 2010, 8:32 PM), http://thehill.com/news-bysubject/foreign-policy/134423-incoming-foreign-affairs-chairwoman-has-iran-no-1-no-2and-no-3-on-to-do-list.
289. See Press Release, Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA), Reps. Berman, Ros-Lehtinen
Announce Launch of Bipartisan Working Group on Iran Sanctions Implementation (Aug. 3,
2010), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ca28_berman/Iran_Sanctions_
WG_forms.shtml.
290. See Rogin, supra note 31.
291. See Johnson, supra note 288 (quoting Representative Ros-Lehtinen as remarking
that Congress “can’t force the administration” to investigate companies and impose
sanctions); see also infra note 292 and accompanying text.
292. Minimizing Potential Threats from Iran: Administrative Perspectives on Economic
Sanctions and Other U.S. Policy Options: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 31 (2009), (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
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not effective enough to cause the Iranian regime to change course. This
section analyzes the possibility of overcoming these problems for the
sanctions to achieve their objective of causing Iran to determine that costs
of nuclear enrichment outweigh their benefit.
1. Sanctions Lack Credibility
While the United States has taken the lead in working with its allies
around the world to reduce business ties with Iran, there is an acute concern
on Capitol Hill that as countries pull out of Iran, other countries—China in
particular—will move in to take over the abandoned projects. 293 When the
United States banned companies from doing business with Iran during the
Clinton Administration, the sanctions only had a harmful effect on Iran for
as long as the deterrent threat of those sanctions on foreign companies
remained credible.294 Once they lost their credibility, foreign firms ignored
them with impunity. 295 Insofar as Iran was not damaged by the sanctions,
they were self-defeating; the only harm came to the companies—such as
Conoco—that had to sacrifice lucrative business deals that enriched foreign
firms (e.g. Total S.A.). 296
Presently, countries who have signed on to the sanctions will be watching
to follow America’s lead.297 If the Obama Administration does not enforce
the sanctions on violating firms, the detrimental effect could be two-fold:
(1) the Iranians will continue to have gasoline suppliers and foreign direct
investors in their energy sector thereby nullifying any disincentive to
continue their nuclear program, and (2) the tentative international consensus
toward sanctions could crumble as U.S. allies refuse to enforce their own
sanctions when they perceive the futility of depriving their corporations—
and their tax coffers—of business opportunities. 298
The preliminary returns on this front are promising, though far from
perfect. As a result of sanctions-related pressure, a plethora of foreign
companies from around the world have either ended their business dealings
with Iran or pledged to do so in the immediate future. 299 Consequently,
Iran’s refined petroleum imports have dropped by 85%, and Iran has lost
some $60 billion in foreign investments. 300 And this is in spite of the fact
that, as of this writing, no non-Iranian firm has been formally sanctioned.301
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Rogin, supra note 31.
See supra notes 118–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118–30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75, 118–30 and accompanying text.
See Mark Dubowitz & Laura Grossman, FOUND. FOR DEF. OF DEMOCRACIES, IRAN’S
CHINESE ENERGY PARTNERS: COMPANIES ELIGIBLE FOR INVESTIGATION UNDER U.S.
SANCTIONS LAW 5 (2010), available at http://www.iranenergyproject.org/iran-chineseenergy-partners.pdf.
298. Id. (“No other country, including America’s most stalwart allies, will force its
companies to abandon lucrative opportunities in Iran if Chinese firms take their stakes in
every deal.”).
299. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
301. See supra Part II.D.
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This is a sign that in many areas of the world, the sanctions are being taken
seriously as a credible deterrent, and that the United States need not, in the
words of Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg, “impose sanctions for
sanctions’ sake” to achieve their policy objectives. 302
It appears, however, that the main credibility problem remains with
China. 303 Chinese firms have not only signed large development deals with
Iran on their own, but they have also back-filled projects abandoned by
firms in compliance with the sanctions.304 This leaves the Obama
Administration with a difficult choice: to sanction the Chinese firms that
are in violation of the Comprehensive Act and face the political costs of
China’s response, or to ignore the violations and make it less likely that
America’s allies will force their companies out of Iran.305
The Obama Administration has remained ambiguous and diplomatic
about the measures it has taken with respect to Chinese violators.306
Although China has increased its investment in Iran’s energy development,
not wanting to be tied to a country whose decaying capacity may not be
able to meet its future energy demands, China has simultaneously hedged
its reliance on Iranian petroleum imports.307 This is a good sign.
Congressional pressure is mounting, however, for the Administration to
enforce the sanctions laws against China, 308 and it may, perhaps, make the
difference between having a successful sanctions policy on the one hand,
and being resigned to a world with a nuclear-armed Iran on the other. 309
2. Sanctions Lack Strength
Even if the United States and its coalition of willing partners are able
keep their companies from doing business with Iran, the question remains
as to whether cutting Iran off from imported gasoline or investment in its
energy sector will inflict enough pain on the regime to achieve their
objectives. Some critics of the sanctions policy argue that they may only
further entrench the Iranian regime by giving it a credible reason to blame
the United States for the hardships of Iranians.310 Others argue that nothing
302. Steinberg, supra note 220.
303. See Dubowitz & Grossman, supra note 297, at 5, 11–12; Pomfret, supra note 205.
304. See Dubowitz & Grossman, supra note 297, at 7–11; Pomfret, supra note 205.
305. See Dubowitz & Grossman, supra note 297, at 12.
306. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 220 (“[W]e don’t believe that it would be productive
or useful in the context of [the investigatory process], in terms of achieving our results to
discuss specific firms. So we are engaging in conversations. We will sustain the
confidentiality of those so long as we think it’s productive to achieving the results we’re
trying to achieve.”); supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text.
307. See Reuel Marc Gerecht & Mark Dubowitz, The Logic of Our Iran Sanctions,
WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 3, 2010, at 11, 12 (“China cut crude imports from Iran between
January and September 2010 by approximately 17 percent from the same period in 2009,
even as the world’s biggest energy consumer bought more oil. . . . [T]he Chinese [do not]
want to bet their economic security on an Iranian energy sector in rapid decline.”).
308. See Rogin, supra note 31; see also supra Part III.B.3.
309. See Dubowitz & Grossman, supra note 297, at 12.
310. See, e.g., Katie Paul, Iran Sanctions: Too Much Too Soon, NEWSWEEK.COM (Dec.
10, 2009), http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/the-gaggle/2009/12/10/iran-sanctions-too-

2386

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

short of military force will cause the Iranians to take the costs of enrichment
seriously because Iran may be far enough in its nuclear development
process that the sanctions, which may take some time to exact a crippling
blow, will not act dramatically enough to keep Iran from attaining weapons
of mass destruction. 311 The Obama Administration has remained steadfast,
however, that following the dual-track of inflicting punitive sanctions while
remaining open to negotiations will be the most successful course to
follow. 312
Early signs of the sanctions success are promising, as they are causing
pain throughout Iran’s economy and pockets of domestic unrest continue to
emerge. 313 Given the repressive nature of Iran’s regime, however, it cannot
be expected to capitulate just on the basis of internal factors alone.314 To
counter the sanctions effectiveness the regime has ended consumer
subsidies and increased levels of security forces to control dissidents.315
Instead, as the Obama Administration has acknowledged, the Iranian
regime must be pushed further to the brink—to the point where the
government’s survival is put in jeopardy. 316
As of this writing, the Administration has not yet indicated the steps it
will take to radically alter Iran’s political calculus. 317 While it has stressed
that all options are on the table when it comes to preventing Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon, 318 there seems to be almost no palate for the
two options that would most critically damage Iran’s nuclear enrichment: a
full international embargo of Iran’s oil, or a military strike against Iran.319
The Stuxnet computer worm and the covert strike against two of Iran’s
leading nuclear scientists probably bought the Administration some time,320
much-too-soon.html; Stephen M. Walt, Looking for One Good Man (or Woman), FOREIGN
POL’Y (Dec. 8, 2009, 9:45 PM), http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/08/
looking_for_one_good_man_or_woman.
311. See, e.g., John Bolton, Op-Ed., The Case for Striking Iran Grows, WALL ST. J., Feb.
12, 2010, at A23. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu falls within this camp, leading
to the speculation that Israel will strike Iran’s nuclear facilities if the United States does not.
See supra note 18; see also Goldberg, supra note 18.
312. See Gerecht & Dubowitz, supra note 307, at 11–12; see also Robert M. Gates, Sec.
Def., Remarks by Sec. Gates at Wall Street Journal CEO Council 2010 Meeting (Nov. 16,
2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4720
(“I think that the political economic strategy is the one that we have to continue to pursue
and ratchet up . . . . [T]hat’s the only long-term solution.”).
313. See Mostaghim & Daragahi, supra note 13.
314. Cf. supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
315. See Farnaz Fassihi, Tehran Ramps Up Arrests To Stall Subsidy-Cut Fight, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 4, 2010, at A17.
316. See Gerecht & Dubowitz, supra note 307, at 13 (“If the West is to stop Tehran’s
quest for a nuke, it must convince the supreme leader, and the Revolutionary Guards who
oversee Iran’s nuclear program, that their pursuit of the bomb will destroy the regime.”);
Sanger, supra note 235.
317. The Administration has indicated more sanctions are on the way to test “Iran’s pain
threshold,” but it has not indicated yet what this may entail. Sanger, supra note 235.
318. See supra note 18; see also Editorial, Mr. Gates on Iran, WASH. POST, Nov. 19,
2010, at A22.
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but as of now, the two sides remain at a stalemate with no indication that
Iran will change course despite the effectiveness of the sanctions.321
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
With the understanding that a crippling, multilateral sanctions regime
targeting Iran represents the last, best hope of peacefully preventing Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons, both Congress and the President will have
to play important roles in shaping how America’s policy is implemented
going forward. This part proposes a number of policy recommendations for
both of the political branches as they continue to struggle with the
challenges posed by Iran.
A. The President
As the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. military, the country’s chief
diplomat, and the executive officer responsible for enforcing American
sanctions laws, the President has the responsibility of ensuring that the full
weight of his resources are used to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons. 322 The President’s strategy will have to be multi-faceted—
oftentimes requiring delicacy, but sometimes the use of a big-stick—and
concentrated on two fronts: (1) Iran, and (2) America’s allies and Iran’s
trading partners. This section discusses potential policy options on both
fronts with an eye toward making the U.S. sanctions laws effective.
1. Iran
President Obama’s open-handed diplomatic strategy has demonstrated
that engagement with Iran has costs. 323 Face-to-face negotiations have lent
the Iranian regime legitimacy, prestige, and domestic credibility; have made
the regime appear as a falsely sincere counterparty in negotiations; and have
bought the regime more time to enrich nuclear fuel and avoid harsher
sanctions by holding out the opportunity for further negotiations.324 Going
forward, the President should be wary of Iranian dilatory tactics and not
premise the softening of sanctions upon these insincere offers to negotiate.
Moreover, when it comes to negotiating with the Iranians, the
Administration should insist upon dealing with parties who are actually
empowered to forge an agreement. Too much time and effort has been
wasted thus far by the P5+1 in negotiating with diplomats who are
powerless to come to meaningful agreements while the Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Khamenei, is the real center of power. 325 Unless the Supreme
Leader is behind the negotiations, they will continue to be meaningless.
At this stage in Iran’s enrichment process, the objectives for the United
States in negotiating with Iran should be different from the “freeze for
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
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freeze” deal the two sides tentatively agreed upon in 2009. Under that
agreement, Iran would suspend some nuclear enrichment and export it out
of the country to be reprocessed while the United States would suspend its
sanctions. 326 The Iranians have repeatedly shown that they cannot be
trusted when it comes to nuclear monitoring, 327 and thus, conceding any
enrichment capacity to the Iranians could very well be conceding to a
bomb.
Instead, with the continued leverage from the sanctions which are
decimating Iran’s economy, 328 the Administration should insist upon a full
suspension of enrichment by Iran. Using these sanctions, as well as
additional measures which he could request from Congress, 329 the
Administration should force the Iranian regime to choose between ending
enrichment or destroying much of its energy sector, the revenues of which it
requires for its political survival. 330 The Administration has already said
that it plans to increase economic pressure on Iran in order to test “Iran’s
pain threshold.” 331 That pain, whatever form it takes, should be inflicted in
earnest before the next round of negotiations.
Lastly, the President should continue to make clear to the Iranian regime
that the United States will not allow Iran to attain nuclear capability under
any circumstances, and that all options—including military ones—are on
the table. 332 While a negotiated settlement is always preferable, and
increased sanctions remain the last best hope of reaching such a settlement,
the Iranian regime must feel sufficiently threatened to relinquish its quest
for nuclear weapons. 333 The sanctions, which are beginning to cripple the
Iranian economy, coupled with the credible threat of force against Iran,
could finally lead the Iranian regime to believe that its nuclear pursuit may
destroy it.
2. America’s Allies and Iran’s Trading Partners
As the history of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act has shown, the key to
having an effective sanctions policy is having multilateral partners invested
in it. 334 Accordingly, the Administration must play a critical role in
persuading countries that have not curtailed their energy partnerships with
Iran to do so, and further, in persuading the countries that have
implemented sanctions to enforce them and extend them further.
With respect to America’s allies, more than at any time in the past, there
is now greater acknowledgement around the world of the seriousness of
326. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 228–32 and accompanying text.
329. See infra Part IV.B.2.
330. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 18.
333. See supra Part III.C.2.
334. Compare supra Part I.B.2 (detailing international resistance to U.S. sanctions against
Iran), with supra Part II.C (detailing the emerging international consensus over the need for
sanctions to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons).
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Iran’s impending nuclear development and the role that investment in Iran’s
energy sector plays in funding that nuclear development. 335 Now that the
Europeans and other major economies such as Japan, South Korea, Canada,
and Australia have taken the first step toward undermining the long-term
viability of Iran’s energy sector by prohibiting investment therein,336 the
Administration should encourage its allies to take the next step in raising
the short-term costs of nuclear proliferation by the Iranian regime by
instituting sanctions on par with those imposed by the United States.
Moreover, the Administration should continue to put diplomatic pressure
on its allies and their private companies to adhere to the sanctions they
already have in place.337 If such private companies continue to invest in
Iran’s energy sector despite the sanctions in place in their home countries,
the Administration should insist those countries sanction the companies,
lest the United States do so itself.
On this point, one of the key factors in convincing America’s allies not
only to enforce their sanctions but also to expand them will be the
leadership role the Administration takes in enforcing American sanctions
against violators in non-cooperative countries. 338 As complying companies
have wound down their investments in Iran, Chinese companies have
moved in to back-fill those contracts. Foreign governments will be uneager
to enforce sanctions against their own companies if doing so will only
enrich others. 339 Right now there is a strong international consensus
towards sanctions, but it may not continue if the sanctions only appear—in
the words of former Vice President Cheney, in his previous life as an oil
executive—“self-defeating.” 340
The Administration should continue to use diplomatic channels to
vigorously discourage the Chinese and non-compliant companies from
taking over abandoned contracts and entering new ones. 341 Furthermore, if
it has not already done so, the Administration should commence the formal
investigation procedures of the Comprehensive Act with respect to the
companies about which it has “credible evidence” of sanctionable
activities. 342 The Administration can use these formal investigations as
added leverage to give the violating parties an out under the “special rule”
which allows a waiver of sanctions for companies that pledge to end their
investment. If this fails, the Administration should actually impose
sanctions on the violating parties such that they are truly forced to choose
between investing in Iran and having access to the American economy.
Notwithstanding the complicated and sometimes precarious trade
relationship between China and the United States, there is a long set of
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
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precedents for the United States imposing sanctions on Chinese companies
and individuals over counter-proliferation issues. 343 Chinese oil companies
need access to American financial markets, natural resources, and
intellectual capital more than the United States needs them.344
Understanding that the purpose of implementing the Comprehensive Act is
not to impose sanctions for the sake of imposing sanctions,345 history has
shown nonetheless that at some point violators need to be punished if the
sanctions are to be taken seriously. 346 It could be the key to holding the
international coalition together and landing a crippling blow to the Iranian
regime.
B. Congress
Insofar as Congress has already done the work of drafting and enacting a
sweeping set of sanctions designed to isolate the Iranian regime, most of the
activity to apply leverage and pressure to bring an end to Iranian nuclear
enrichment will take place in the executive branch. That does not mean,
however, that Congress should be relegated to an entirely passive role in
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and funding terrorist
groups. Instead, through its core constitutional competencies of oversight
and legislation, Congress should ensure that the President is properly
enforcing the sanctions that he currently has at his disposal, and that the
President is given expanded options to meet a changing policy landscape.
1. Oversight and Investigation
Congress has an obvious interest in seeing that the laws it passes are
“faithfully executed,” yet it is beyond Congress’s power to force the
Executive to investigate violations or apply sanctions. 347 What Congress
can do, however, is to conduct oversight hearings through the committee
structure of Congress to make the Administration accountable for its actions
vis-à-vis the sanctions laws and put political pressure on the President to
enforce those laws in a manner consistent with the national interest.348 In
this respect, much of Congress’s role will be shaped in reaction to how the
President executes the law.
Representative Ilena Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chair of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee in the 112th Congress, has stated that Iran will be the
Committee’s “No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3” priority, which is a good sign.349
343. See Dubowitz & Grossman, supra note 297, at 29–34 (listing ninety Chinese entities
that have been sanctioned by the United States between 1991 and 2010).
344. See id. at 11–27 (detailing the presence of Chinese energy firms in American
markets); Mark Dubowitz, Put China To A Choice: Tehran or Texas, FORBES.COM (Oct. 17,
2010, 8:51 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/energysource/2010/10/17/put-china-to-a-choicetehran-or-texas/.
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According to Representative Ros-Lehtinen, she and her colleagues intend to
prevent the Comprehensive Act from becoming another “interesting
historical document[]” that goes unimplemented by the President by
conducting “oversight hearings that will ask the administration, ‘Why aren’t
you sanctioning more banks and companies and countries? What are we
doing and what are you waiting for?’” 350 Such hearings should be
conducted with the same searching objectives by Representative RosLehtinen’s counterparts in the Senate as well.
During these hearings, Congress should use the open-source reporting on
Iran’s energy sector available from the Government Accountability Office,
the Congressional Research Service, the media, and other assorted outlets to
present the Administration with “credible evidence” of sanctionable
activity, 351 which would require further investigation according to the
law. 352 In this respect, Congress should continue to insist that the
Administration explain its interpretation of the credible evidence standard
and whether or not it had commenced investigations into parties about
which credible evidence existed.
Moreover, the Comprehensive Act contains a number of formal oversight
mechanisms that require the President to report to Congress on the
Administration’s efforts to discourage sanctionable involvement with
Iran. 353 Depending upon the President’s reports, the Comprehensive Act
may require the President to conduct mandatory investigations into
countries and companies in apparent violation of the law.354 Should the
President request a temporary postponement of the investigations for
diplomatic reasons as the law allows, Congress should be sensitive to
giving the President such diplomatic flexibility without unnecessarily
embroiling the United States in a difficult situation with countries such as
China and Russia.
If it becomes clear that the President’s diplomatic negotiations have
proven unsuccessful, however, the investigatory latitude given to the
President should not be indefinite. Only then should the mandatory
investigation provision be triggered.
In a circumstance where an
investigation yields parties in violation of the law, the President would not
be backed into an inescapable corner because he could still issue a waiver to
the sanctions as President Clinton did in 1998.355 If such a waiver is issued,
again Congress should hold the President accountable for explaining his
understanding of the “necessary to the national interest” standard.356
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2. Legislation
Although the Comprehensive Act represented, in the words of President
Obama, “the toughest sanctions against Iran ever passed by the United
States Congress,” 357 there are still policy actions Congress can take to react
to the dynamics of the Iranian problem that have evolved in the months
since the Act’s passage. On the one hand, America’s allies around the
world have proven more amenable to adopting economic sanctions against
Iran than at any time in the past. 358 On the other hand, in spite of the pain
the current sanctions are causing to the Iranian treasury, Iran remains
immovable in its refusal to negotiate over its nuclear enrichment
program. 359 Congress can once again take the lead in refining the scope of
sanctions to increase the pressure on Iran and to further encourage allies to
cut ties with Iran.
In order to sufficiently change the Iranian regime’s political calculus,
Congress should create policy that will ratchet up the pain on the Iranian
regime to the point that it fears for its survival. 360 To do so, Congress
should take aim at Iran’s Achilles’ heel: its dependence on revenues from
oil exports. 361 An absolute extraterritorial ban on purchasing Iranian crude
(i.e., an embargo) would cause painful shocks to the global oil markets and
would likely be opposed by America’s allies.362 Sanctions that indirectly
affect demand for Iranian oil by making it more difficult for Iran to engage
in petroleum transactions and invest in the infrastructure necessary to bring
oil to market could allow Iran’s competitors to increase oil production to
counter any slack in global oil supply, however. 363 Such a policy could be
just as effective as an embargo without causing major diplomatic problems.
Legislation introduced in December 2010 by Senators Robert Casey (DPA) and Scott Brown (R-MA) seeks to accomplish just that.364 Among its
provisions, the bill expedites the process for the Treasury Department to
investigate and designate the front-companies used by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps—which controls much of the country’s
petroleum industry—to evade sanctions. 365 Sanctions would then be
imposed on any party doing business with these front-companies. 366
Additionally, the bill would sanction entities that subscribe to Iran’s
sovereign debt, pay in advance for oil deliveries, or sign long-term contracts
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to pay for oil and gas from Iran. 367 The effect of these provisions would be
to deny Iran access to the large up-front cash inflows it desperately needs to
invest in its decaying infrastructure, or, otherwise, to deny Iran the ability to
use the long-term supply contracts as collateral to raise debt.368 Such
punitive measures could greatly reduce Iran’s ability to bring oil to market
and deny the Iranian regime the revenue it needs to survive.
In sum, the 112th Congress should pass the Casey-Brown measure—or
others like it—as early as possible. Once passed, Congress should
encourage the President to persuade America’s foreign partners to continue
to do whatever is necessary to choke off Iran’s energy sector.
CONCLUSION
The issues raised by the Comprehensive Act are issues that are common
to the conflicts created by the implementation American foreign policy. As
this Comment discusses, the Comprehensive Act raises potential legal and
political conflicts between the President and Congress, the United States
and its international allies, as well as between the United States and its
adversaries.
If the world does not want to live with a nuclear Iran, which has long
made its belligerent ambitions apparent, then the world must learn from its
past mistakes. The Iranian regime must be sufficiently accosted for its
aggressions if it is to sacrifice its nuclear ambitions. Short of war, the
rigorous sanctions that have been passed by the U.S. Congress and
legislatures around the globe represent the only legitimate option to prevent
Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, it remains
to be seen how far the President will go to prevent a nuclear Iran.
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